OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM

Director J. Edgar Hoover started the FBI National Academy to increase the professionalism and training of local law enforcement officers nationwide in response to growing problems faced throughout the country. Founded on July 29, 1935, with 23 students in attendance, the National Academy (NA) currently provides a wide range of leadership and specialized training, as well as an opportunity for professionals to discuss ideas, techniques, and experiences. Officers attending the NA share the facilities of the FBI Academy with FBI agent trainees, in-service students, and academy faculty and staff.¹ In addition, the DEA houses its academy nearby and uses many of the same amenities. As with other institutions of higher learning, the NA lodges students in dormitory rooms and provides them with a wide array of services, including a dining hall, library, pool, television rooms, computer labs, and shopping areas.

• nominated by the heads of their agencies;

• at least 25 years of age;

• duly sworn officers in federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies;

• within a certain height-weight standard;

• mentally and physically capable of performance;

• at least the rank of lieutenant (or equivalent); and

• willing to remain in the field of law enforcement for at least 3 additional years.

For heads of agencies, their governing bodies or officials must nominate them. A city council member, mayor, or city manager would select a chief of police, whereas a county commissioner or similarly appointed official would choose a sheriff.

Next, agencies obtain official applications from their local FBI offices. Nominees must complete the extensive forms and have them signed by their chief executives. Then, they return them to the FBI, which checks the applications for completeness and places the candidates’ names on a waiting list.

When openings occur, the FBI informs applicants of their selection to attend the academy, pending results of a thorough background investigation and physical examination to determine their ability to perform strenuous physical activity. Upon completion of these two phases, the NA schedules the candidates for an upcoming session. The entire process can take as much as a year to complete.

Academy Training

Once selected to attend the NA, applicants receive a lengthy list of available classes. With the exception of physical training, the University of Virginia accredits all courses and awards college credit to students who successfully complete them. For certain classes, the university bestows graduate level credit for officers with bachelor’s degrees.

Students must attend one class in legal matters (except foreign students), behavioral science, law enforcement communication, leadership, forensic science, and physical training (a noncredit course) and can earn up to 19 credit hours. While numerous courses are available in each of these subjects (except physical training), students may select only one class per area. The program also offers other noncredit courses. In addition, the NA hosts a weekly Enrichment Night wherein a variety of speakers give presentations on various law enforcement-related topics, such as risk management, cults, and terrorism.

Monday through Friday, students attend classes, set in 2-hour blocks. They must wear mandatory dress uniforms, consisting of color-coordinated shirts and khaki pants, during business hours on weekdays, even when not in class. FBI agent trainees wear similar uniforms.

In addition to physical training classes, students are encouraged to participate in the FBI Fitness Challenge, a set of increasingly difficult and demanding physical endurance events. Weekly sessions, named after characters or objects in The Wizard of Oz, start with a 1.8mile run called Not in Kansas Anymore and end with the Yellow Brick Road, a 6.1-mile run and obstacle course. All students who complete the Fitness Challenge receive a yellow brick, which some alumni list as a valued memento.

Besides providing a variety of courses, the NA also broadens the experience with several group outings, such as visits to national landmarks in Washington D.C., and nearby police departments. The International Night allows foreign attendees to showcase their homelands. Often, these students dress in traditional attire, prepare native food and drink, and invite foreign delegates currently in the United States to help educate their classmates about their countries.

Students receive all of this training at no cost to their agencies. The sponsoring department only has to continue paying the salary of the officer attending. The NA provides the funds for housing, dining, and travel. Students or their sponsoring agencies only have to cover personal expenses and the price of uniforms.

Alumni Association

All NA graduates can join the FBI National Academy Associates, a professional, worldwide organization. These alumni continue to provide localized training and, once a year, host a national conference. Members exert considerable professional influence as leaders in organizations, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff’s Association, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Officers, the International Association of Women in Policing, and the National Association of State Directors of Law Enforcement. One of every five active-duty graduates now heads a law enforcement agency, and most alumni participate in the training-oriented organization.

Networking

Aligning themselves with other professionals throughout the world who share the same profession proved an immense benefit. As one graduate explained, “From an administrative perspective, the value in sending other command officers to the academy is to broaden their understanding of law enforcement from a national point of view to make them realize that most of the problems they face have been faced by others who probably came up with some sort of good way to address it.” For example, if a department is considering implementing a new procedure or looking for equipment to help in records management, no doubt one of the many active or retired NA alumni has “been there, done that.” If officers need directions to a state laboratory or training location, no doubt nearby graduates can help. Often, they open their own homes to others based simply on the fact that the requestor is a fellow graduate. As an alumnus said, “There is an unwritten trust between National Academy brethren that can’t be matched by any other organization.” Another summed up his experience as “breakfast with an officer from China, lunch with an officer from Korea, and dinner with an officer from England—in other words, the extension of contacts all over the world.”

Lifestyle Changes

This category revealed the depth that many graduates went to in explaining their feelings about the NA experience and how it enriched their lives. One said, “The opportunity to take 3 months, get away from everything, and be able to think and self-reflect was key.” He committed himself to several goals while away, such as getting into a physical fitness routine and reflecting on his family and work. He felt that the time away made him a better administrator, a better person, and a better husband and father. Another alumnus stated, “My family life has become better on all different levels. I learned to communicate with my wife, she learned how to become more independent, and my kids learned to appreciate their father a little more.”

Academic Fulfillment

One graduate indicated that after attending the NA, his personal goal of completing college became key to him. He felt that it was this experience that enabled him not only to finish his bachelor’s degree but to obtain his master’s and doctorate as well. He now teaches as a visiting assistant professor in addition to his duties as an assistant chief of police.

Career Enhancement

While most alumni did not list this as one of the more rewarding benefits from attending, they did acknowledge that graduating from the NA helps a law enforcement officer’s career. One said, “Most city managers will not even consider chief candidates unless they have been to the National Academy.” While this statement would not apply in all cases, a quick look at police executive employment Web sites or advertisements in professional journals will show the importance of obtaining advanced training for law enforcement managers.

Departmental Benefits

As with the personal benefits, the author found networking the most substantial benefit to the agency as well. Many of the NA alumni reported that when their departments needed assistance from an outside agency, a call to a fellow graduate in that or a nearby department made the difference. Knowing officers from different countries or agencies or those with specific abilities often proved helpful as well.

Fostering Community Partnerships That Prevent Crime and Promote Quality of Life
By Clyde L. Cronkhite, D.P.A.

During the past decade, crime has decreased in urban areas, but, subsequently, some rural communities have experienced an increase because offenders have been forced away from 1large cities. This trend threatens the quality of life in many suburban and rural areas. Therefore, a growing number of townships are taking a proactive posture against this movement by focusing on community-based crime prevention programs, which unite communities in the fight to thwart the spread of crime. The Challenge McDonough County, Illinois, is in the western part of the state with a population of approximately 40,000 and includes Macomb, a university town of 20,000 residents plus 12,000 college students.

The Challenge

McDonough County, Illinois, is in the western part of the state with a population of approximately 40,000 and includes Macomb, a university town of 20,000 residents plus 12,000 college students. Although Macomb offers a family friendly atmosphere with a low crime rate, harbingers of gang and drug activities surfaced, perhaps from an influx of individuals seeking a haven from the increased law enforcement efforts in larger cities. Drug arrests began to occur and evidence of graffiti appeared. Therefore, citizens of Macomb decided to handle these problems by drawing from their community-based, crime prevention program experiences. Macomb’s results may serve as a model for other cities confronting similar trends.

The Concept

Many of today’s crime prevention approaches are based on an experiment conducted in a New Jersey community years ago, which spotlighted the importance of maintaining neighborhoods to keep 2communities relatively crime free. The broken windows theory holds that such issues as street maintenance and lighting, limits on the number of families living in a single dwelling, and control of absentee landlord rentals reduce crime. Additionally, attention to minor infractions that erode well-kept, safe environments, such as loud music, abandoned cars, and graffiti, can prevent the spread of gang violence, drug abuse, and other criminal conduct. Macomb applied the broken windows concept in a rural environment by forming community partnerships that result in a continuous focus on quality-of-life issues.

The Approach

In early 1994, Macomb formed a Crime and Quality of Life Advisory Committee, changing the name in 1996 to Community Quality of Life Committee and expanding the purview to include all of McDonough County. The committee seeks “to support efforts that contribute to the excellence of our community and to monitor and give advice regarding maintaining and enhancing community quality of life, including the prevention and reduction of crimes that adversely impact our 3 neighborhoods.”

The committee recruited concerned citizens who have a responsibility for quality of life and criminal justice academicians from the local university, as well as other community leaders. Several committee members, such as the fire chief, sheriff, mayor, school superintendent, executive director of the housing authority, and the local state senator, were selected because their positions have the responsibility and authority to provide a prospering neighborhood.

The major responsibility of the advisory committee involves developing a method for measuring the quality of life in the community, setting a baseline, and monitoring its status. To complete this task, a criminal justice research specialist (a member of the committee) and graduate assistants from the local university’s department of law enforcement and justice administration analyzed 26 years of crime trends in Macomb and McDonough County, comparing them with eight contiguous counties and totals for the state of Illinois. They selected “community wellness” indicators (e.g., poverty and welfare rates, per capita income, single parent families, births by mothers under 18 years of age, truancy violations, and emergency room admissions) from their research.

The committee meets at least four times a year, and members review these indicators. Then, they publish a community “report card” or “wellness report.” Any indication that the community is adversely affected requires recommendations for combating the negative factors before they become substantial problems.

As a result of the crime trend analysis, committee members noted early signs of substance abuse and gang involvement in the crime trends. As a result, the committee formed a youth task force that meets monthly. The task force determines the extent of the problem, confirms what is being done about the issue, recognizes any unnecessary duplication of services, decides the need for additional action and what it should be, and recommends steps that advisory committee members should take.

The school superintendent and a local religious leader oversee the youth task force. Several of the advisory committee members, such as the police chief and director of the housing authority, serve on the task force as well. Additionally, persons who deal daily with youth problems comprise part of the task force, along with an individual from the university who is an expert in substance abuse problems.

Task force members have made several recommendations, such as school dress codes, truancy enforcement, a youth teen center, and ordinances to restrict alcohol and tobacco use by minors to combat the growing crime trend. At the youth center, teens socialize in a nonalcoholic environment and participate in an annual film festival. Also, the task force uses the local cable television channel and area newspapers to alert parents about gangs and substance abuse among teens.

Task force members collected information about nearly 100 community activities available to youths and conveyed it to parents and teens through the local media and a Web site. They also made the information available to practitioners who deal with young people in trouble. Members encouraged police officers to divert underage offenders to these community activities, rather than counseling and releasing them.

Additionally, when rental property inhabited by students around the local university began to deteriorate, the task force recommended an adopt-a-street program, which made various university student organizations responsible for preserving quality of life in their own neighborhoods. This program, implemented throughout the police department, has proven successful.

 

Community Wellness Indicators

• Population size, density, age, ethnicity, and education
• Single parent families
• Births by mothers under 18 years of age
• Poverty, welfare, unemployment, and rental and unoccupied property rates
• Per capita income
• Retail and wholesale sales
• Property tax assessment
• Tax revenues
• Ratio of police officers and firefighters per 1,000 residents
• Index crimes
• Arrest index
• Traffic accidents
• Emergency room admissions
• Calls for emergency services
• Reports of school confrontation and truancy

Recognition Days

The advisory committee recommended spotlighting people who and activities that enhance well-maintained communities. This evolved into a yearly event held each September and includes exhibits and demonstrations by most county public safety agencies. Local schools bring students to the event where thousands of community members meet police, fire, emergency, and rescue officers. Community members have the opportunity to thank these public employees and have their pictures taken with them, pet the police dogs, climb the fire equipment, sound the police siren, and perform other such activities. The celebration includes a supplement in the local newspaper that commends and provides photographs of members of the county public safety agencies. The committee gives awards to individual agencies, as well as to citizens who contribute to a safe community. This yearly event fosters communication and trust between the public safety agencies and the community and promotes awareness of the relationship between public safety and community quality of life. During the past 10 years, nearly 100 citizens and organizations have been honored for their contributions to local quality of life.

Conclusion

As crime, particularly drug use and gang violence, seeps into smaller communities, some townships are implementing procedures to deter its spreading. The crime prevention and quality-of-life effort in McDonough County, Illinois, seeks to prevent this ever-increasing threat. An advisory committee oversees the program and promotes cooperation and coordination among the various entities that have a responsibility for ensuring a flourishing community.

The committee established and continually monitors community wellness indicators. When these indicators disclose the beginning signs of activities that adversely will impact quality of life, committee members create task forces to recommend remedies. Then, these solutions are implemented through the committee and aim to prevent community infections before they become serious.

When this project began in the early 1990s, crime had begun its downward trend across the country. However, in Macomb, Illinois, as in many smaller communities, crime was on the rise. After the implementation of this program, crime has decreased and quality of life has become a hallmark of the community.

Anyone involved in resolving social problems realizes that no perfect solutions exist. However, insightful, preventative activities can inhibit and even preclude many adverse conditions that result in the deterioration of community quality of life and the increase of crime. The approach taken by McDonough County may serve as a useful model to other localities working to prevent crime and preserve a nurturing community.

Endnotes

¹ Dr. Michael Hazlett, Western Illinois University, Department of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration, “Community Quality of Life 1993-1994,” Community Wellness Factor Report.

² For more information on this topic, see Frank Perry, “Repairing Broken Windows: Preventing Corruption Within Our Ranks,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, February 2001, 23-26; and J.Q. Wilson and G. Kelling, “The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, 29-38.

³ The mission statement is restated in the minutes of the first Crime and Quality of Life Advisory Committee (CQLAC) meeting each year. These minutes are kept by the current CQLAC chair, Mr. Bill Jacob, Executive Director, McDonough County Housing Authority, 322 West Piper Street, Macomb, Illinois 61455.

⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 1992 (Washington, DC, 1993).

Dr. Cronkhite, a former police practitioner, is a law enforcement and justice administration professor, commentator, and consultant at Western Illinois University in Macomb.

The Bulletin’s
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Coordinated Terrorist Attacks Implications for Local Responders
By BRIAN K. HOUGHTON, Ph.D., and JONATHAN M. SCHACHTER, Ph.D.

 

With elections only a few days away, the terrorism threat level is at high, and law enforcement personnel are on the lookout for suspicious behavior that may indicate an imminent terrorist attack. As the morning commute gets underway, three bombs explode on a commuter train at a downtown station, killing and injuring those in the path of the blast wave and shrapnel. Law enforcement officers and emergency medical personnel respond, but, as they mobilize, four more bombs explode in another train arriving at the same station, instantly doubling the number of people dead and wounded. Soon, another bomb goes off inside a train a few miles away, requiring public safety personnel and resources there as well. The nightmare reaches its peak 5 minutes later as two more bombs blow apart a commuter train at still another downtown location, killing and injuring even more people. The emergency response community now faces mass fatalities and seemingly countless injuries at three separate sites. Though this scenario sounds like the subject of novels and Hollywood thrillers, it actually took place on March 11, 2004, in Madrid, 1Spain. This type of incident, like many similar ones in recent years, has important implications for the ways in which local responders prepare for terrorist attacks of all kinds.

DEFINITIONS AND TRENDS

Coordinated terrorist assaults include elements that occur simultaneously or nearly so and are conducted by a single terrorist organization or jointly by sympathetic groups. Historically, however, the vast majority of hazardous device-based terrorist attacks have not fit this description, but have been “simple” in design, featuring only one component, such as a single, placed bomb or a suicide bomber. Nevertheless, in recent years, the number of coordinated assaults has increased, especially among the terrorist groups of greatest concern to the United States. Moreover, since 1983, half of the 14 terrorist incidents with 100 or more fatalities were coordinated ² ones.

A mix of interrelated reasons makes coordinated attacks appealing to terrorist groups. Such incidents have the potential to cause greater damage than simple operations in terms of the lives, property, and geographic areas affected, as well as the psychological impact. The increased destruction lends credibility to the terrorist organization as it reflects an ability to plan and execute sophisticated operations, implies a multiplicity of personnel and supporters, and creates the impression that the group can cover many areas at the same time. This combination of perceived and actual destructive power and resultant credibility makes such attacks and the organizations that perpetrate them more “newsworthy,” allowing such groups to gain public attention, one of the main goals of all terrorist campaigns.

Overall, coordinated terrorist incidents fall into three main categories: 1) parallel device attacks, where participants use more than one device simultaneously or almost simultaneously in the same location; 2) secondary attacks, where the initial assault is followed by one or more additional attacks in the same location, typically targeting responders; and 3) multiple dispersed attacks, where groups stage simultaneous or near-simultaneous ones at different locations. Depending on the type, more than one incident scene might exist, but, taken together, they constitute a single attack, with repercussions greater than those of the individual-component category. With this in mind, understanding how terrorists use coordinated assaults can assist local emergency responders in better planning, training, and organizing to respond to such incidents.

Parallel Devices

Parallel devices allow terrorists to inflict greater damage in any one incident site without having to construct or transport a single, larger one required to create similar results. In other words, rather than relying on one large bomb, terrorists can use two or more smaller, yet equally lethal, ones. The reasonable assumption that smaller devices are less vulnerable to detection raises the likelihood of the attack’s execution. Moreover, regardless of the size of the bomb, even if one or more of the perpetrators is intercepted, others still may manage to complete their missions. Thus, parallel devices provide terrorists with greater assurance that they will execute at least part of their planned attack. The use of parallel devices also allows terrorists to create multiple focus points at the incident site, thereby expanding the overall perimeter affected by the attack. With this expansion comes greater demand for both responders and resources, which can tax emergency reaction elsewhere in the jurisdiction. At the same time, this high concentration of forces in a single location potentially increases their susceptibility to secondary attacks.

The triple-suicide bombing carried out by Hamas on September 4, 1997, on the Ben-Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem can demonstrate a ³ parallel device attack. In that one, three males, one dressed as a woman, each detonated a 4- to 5-pound bomb packed with nuts and bolts to create puncture, as well as blast, injuries. Five people were killed and 181 were wounded.

Attackers also employed parallel devices in the October 12, 2002, attack in Bali, which killed 202. ⁴ The first blast, from a relatively small bomb, drew people out onto the street and was followed 10 to 15 seconds later by a much larger explosion, which caused most of the destruction. The near-simultaneous attacks increased the lethality of the bombings, which targeted mainly Western tourists.

Secondary Attacks

Secondary attacks have two or more stages of attack. The first one draws in emergency responders, regardless of the extent of deaths and injuries. In the second, the responders themselves become the target and include not only law enforcement, fire and rescue, and emergency medical personnel but civilian Good Samaritans as well.

Targeting responders serves two main purposes. First, it threatens to delay or deny treatment to victims from the first stage of the attack, increasing the likelihood of death and the severity of injuries. Second, killing, injuring, or otherwise hindering responders exacerbates the public’s feelings of fear and helplessness by demonstrating the vulnerability of society’s guardians. To the extent that symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder result from both the trauma and the perceived powerlessness to influence events and outcomes, this type of attack might make such reactions more likely among responders and the public alike.

The Provisional IRA often used secondary devices.⁵ Similarly, two bombings in 1997— one at a clinic in suburban Atlanta that provided abortions and one at an Atlanta gay nightclub—also involved the use of secondary devices. ⁶

Multiple Dispersed Attacks

 

Dispersed attacks, like the other two types of coordinated assaults, seek to expand the extent and spread of damage and fear. When carried out within the same jurisdiction, they also threaten to exhaust response resources more quickly, which, as in the case of secondary attacks, could lead to delays in treatment or an increase in fear due to the perception of responders being overwhelmed.

The scope of the spread in dispersed attacks determines their impact on local responding agencies. Thus, for example, the crash of hijacked United Flight 93 near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, on September 11, 2001, taxed the responders in that and neighboring communities, but did not pull local responders from New York City, where they were needed to respond to the attacks on the World Trade Center.⁷ If planes were forced down in two locations on opposite sides of the same city, however, that city would have to divide its resources or rely more heavily on mutual aid.

Attacks carried out across jurisdictions or operational areas (or even across countries) create more political-strategic than local-tactical dispersion effects. The multiplicity of al-Qaeda’s assaults on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 (across countries) and of the ones of September 2001 (across states), for example, demonstrated to the world that al Qaeda could plan and execute highly lethal, near-simultaneous operations, hundreds of miles apart, against the world’s most powerful country. In both of these cases, the group had multiple tactical targets but only one strategic target—the United States. Al-Qaeda’s capability undoubtedly earned the group political capital both in terms of being taken seriously by the international community and for recruitment purposes around the world.

Al Qaeda and the groups it has inspired continue to rely on dispersed attacks, as evidenced in the May 2003 incidents in Morocco and Saudi Arabia. ⁸ These were at once dispersed across and within countries. The incidents in these two countries were dispersed in each—five simultaneous assaults in Casablanca and three simultaneous ones in Riyadh.

Other terrorist groups have carried out multiple dispersed attacks. The Hizbullah bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and French military headquarters on October 23, 1983, killed 241 and 58, respectively.⁹ Almost a decade later, in the spring of 1993, the Provisional IRA executed a number of dispersed assaults, including the firebombing of two department stores, the hijacking and bombing of a pair of taxis in London, and the placing of bombs in trash cans a block apart to target those fleeing the first blast.¹⁰ The March 20, 1995, Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, which killed 12 and injured more than 1,000, also comprised multiple dispersed incidents. The attackers released gas via crude dispersal mechanisms simultaneously on five different subway cars on three separate lines.

Hoaxes also can cause fear and panic in a population, and terrorists have used simultaneous multiple dispersed hoaxes to create trouble for emergency responders. In January 2004, terrorists contacted law enforcement personnel in Belfast, Northern Ireland, indicating that they had placed multiple car bombs around the city. ¹² The subsequent response to the calls strained the responder community and locked down traffic throughout the city. Given the credible threat, local law enforcement agencies had no choice but to respond.

SIMILARITIES

Probably due to ease of planning and manufacture, the individual-component portions within coordinated incidents have tended to be of the same type, such as simultaneous or subsequent pipe bombs, car bombs, or suicide bombers. Little reason exists to believe that this trend will continue, especially in light of some recent examples of mixed-type attacks.

On December 1, 2001, just yards from where the triple-suicide bombing took place in Jerusalem more than 4 years earlier, Hamas carried out a double-suicide bombing, followed approximately 20 minutes later by a car bomb. ¹³ Eleven people were killed and approximately 180 were wounded in the combined explosions. This one proves noteworthy not only because it provides an example of different means being used in the same assault but also because it demonstrates that the types of coordinated attacks can be combined. The two suicide bombers made this a parallel device attack, while the car bomb turned it into a secondary one as well. Clearly, the categories described are not mutually exclusive.

Another mixed-type and mixed-category attack is the simultaneous al-Qaeda suicide and car bombings of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya (parallel devices), which occurred at the same time as the attempted shooting down of an Israeli 757 jetliner in the same city (dispersed attacks) on November 28, 2002. ¹⁴ While the aircraft emerged undamaged, 13 people were killed and approximately 80 were injured in the hotel bombings.

IMPLICATIONS

Coordinated attacks are not a new phenomenon. However, their increasing frequency makes it worth reviewing some of the implications for local responding agencies.

Decentralize Equipment and Personnel

The potential for coordinated attacks means that local responders must have the capability to respond to multiple incidents at multiple locations. Positioning equipment and personnel in a central site might make organizational sense, but could turn into a liability in the event that attacks occur at opposite extremes of the operational area or if the equipment or personnel themselves become targets.

Resist Deploying All Resources

Agencies may find it tempting, especially in the face of a first terrorist attack, to “hyperrespond,” sending everyone and everything to the incident site. But, they should resist this temptation for two reasons. First, secondary attacks could target responders and equipment. It is prudent to hold some back (though obviously not to the detriment of necessary patient care or public safety) in anticipation of such an occurrence. Second, dispersed attacks or other types of routine emergencies will demand responders elsewhere. As is the case with any mass-casualty event, rapid availability of mutual aid remains critical.

Plan, Exercise, and Train

Local responders know well the importance of prior planning and frequent and realistic training and exercises for making complex technical procedures a matter of habit. In this regard, responding to coordinated assaults is no different from reacting to any other type of emergency. Responders’ actions reflect the extent to which they have prepared and trained for such occurrences. Moreover, as response to hazardous device assaults involves fire and rescue, emergency medical, law enforcement, and other agencies, all must train together for coordinated attack scenarios.

With this in mind, local agencies should add coordinated attack response “playbooks” to their emergency operations plans. Alternatively, they could include coordinated attack scenarios in other existing playbooks for similar situations. Agencies should rigorously practice the new procedures so responders at all levels become thoroughly familiar with them.

Coordinated attack response planning and training should address command-level issues as well. Emergency response agencies should consider such questions as whether to designate single or multiple incident commanders at the dispersed locations and how best to allocate and coordinate limited resources among multiple attack sites.

Protect the Force

It is difficult to know in advance whether secondary attacks will occur. An attack followed by a secondary one appears the same as a single assault until responders recognize that they have become the target. Therefore, responders must assume that terrorists will attempt one. This puts a premium on force protection, a role that falls primarily to law enforcement officials who can take a number of simple but crucial steps at the scene to help deter or prevent secondary attacks. These include establishing a secure perimeter far enough from the locus of the first assault to allow responders to do their jobs safely; sweeping for secondary devices; and monitoring, photographing, and interviewing bystanders, among whom might be eyewitnesses and terrorist spotters. Of importance, force protection, while essentially a law enforcement function, cannot be properly executed without the cooperation of and coordination with fire and rescue, emergency medical, and other responding agencies.

CONCLUSION

Along with the recent increase in coordinated attacks has come a corresponding rise in fatalities and injuries. Terrorists feel the need to create ever greater impact on their targeted societies, and coordinated assaults bring both added lethality and “newsworthiness.” Al Qaeda is not the only terrorist group attacking in this manner. Terrorists around the world are learning from each other’s successes and adopting and refining this tactic. For emergency responders, coordinated attacks bring not only greater danger to the public they serve but also the potential that responders themselves may be targeted. To mitigate the effects of such incidents, law enforcement agencies and other local responders must incorporate coordinated attack scenarios into their planning, training, and deployment.

 

Endnotes

1 Lawrence Wright, “The Terror Web,” The New Yorker, August 2, 2004; retrieved on August 5, 2004, from http://www.newyorker.com.

2 Pre-2001 data from Chris Quillen, “Mass Casualty Bombings Chronology,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25 (2002): 293-302.

3 Serge Schmemann, “Bombings in Jerusalem: The Overview,” New York Times, September 7, 1997, sec. A1; and MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base; retrieved on August 4, 2004, from http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=2340.

4 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (Washington, DC, April 2003), 18; retrieved on February 1, 2004, from http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/20177.pdf.

5 George Buck, Preparing for Terrorism: An Emergency Services Guide (Albany, NY: Delmar, 2002), 18; and Owen Bowcott, “Soldier Dies as IRA Bombers Ambush Patrol,” The Guardian, February 10, 1993, 2.

6 John Harmon, “Terrorism: It’s Getting Less Disciplined, More Dangerous,” Cox News Service, March 31, 1999.

7 This does not include federal resources, which could be a different matter.

8 “Bombs Kill at Least 20 in Downtown Casablanca,” CNN.com, May 19, 2003; retrieved on August 4, 2004, from http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/05/16/morocco.blasts/; and “U.S., Saudis Suspect al Qaeda in Riyadh Blasts,” CNN.com, May 13, 2002; retrieved on August 5, 2004, from http://www.cnn.com/ 2003/WORLD/meast/05/12 saudi.blast/.

9 Audrey Kurth Cronin, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, August 28, 2003; retrieved on February 2, 2004, from http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RL32058.pdf.

10 “Bombs Set Shops Ablaze,” Daily Mail, May 10, 1993, 5; “Hijacked Drivers Chose to Risk Death,” The Times, April 27, 1993; and Ronald Faux, “Warrington Weeps for Lives Shattered by IRA Bombers,” The Times, March 22, 1993.

11 Many sources list over 5,000 injured in this attack. However, around 4,000 of those were diagnosed as “worried well.”

12 Claire Regan, “UDA Blamed for Hoax Alerts,” Belfast Telegraph, January 16, 2004.

13 Lee Hockstader, “Two Suicide Bombers Kill at Least 10 in Jerusalem: Attacks, Nearby Car Blast Wound 170 in Heart of City,” Washington Post, December 2, 2001, sec. A1.

14 Emily Wax, “Suicide Bombers Kill 12 at Resort in Kenya: Hotel Hosted Israelis, Missiles Fired Nearby at Plane,” Washington Post, November 29, 2002, sec. A1. Dr. Houghton is the director of research at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Dr. Schachter is a lecturer at North-western University in Evanston, Illinois. The statements in this article reflect the personal opinions of the authors and not necessarily those of the organizations with which they are affiliated.

The Bulletin Honors

The California Highway Patrol Academy in Sacramento presents its World Trade Center 9/11 Memorial Fountain, which honors the men and women who died in those attacks. Dedicated on August 11, 2004, the fountain features two rectangular black marble pillars, representing the twin towers, resting on a square concrete pedestal. A donated piece of a steel I beam from the World Trade Center rests between the two marble buildings. Behind the towers sits a large upright rectangular structure inscribed with the initials “WTC”; water flows over it, coming to rest in a pool at the foot of the pedestal.

Productivity Analysis for Basic Police Patrol Activities By Roy H. Herndon III

Law enforcement officers prove valuable to their communities in a variety of ways, not all of which can be measured easily. To this end, agencies often struggle to find methods to fairly evaluate their personnel. Departments must give factors, such as officer competence and courtesy, appropriate weight. Managers need to value the quality of the tasks performed and not focus only on the quantity.

However, fully and accurately evaluating personnel does require a fair measurement of productivity. “Understandably...law enforcement organizations do not condone ‘quotas’.... Rather, each agency does have certain expected levels of performance that they attempt to monitor officers’ performance by. The key is in developing some realistic measurement devices that will substantiate that the officer is working and that this work is 1meaningful to the community.” While departments must avoid mandating specific numbers for performance criteria, they still can gauge an officer’s productivity by analyzing certain measurable activities related to the job. This then can provide useful insight for incorporation into the employee’s overall evaluation. The Conway, Arkansas, Police Department has a system in place to conduct quantitative, employable measures of its officers’ performance. Further, it has found that in response to fair and meaningful evaluation, its personnel strive for higher standards. “When employees feel their hard work 2 counts for something, they strive to do their best.”

OFFICER REPORTS

Daily Activity Report

The officer’s daily activity report collects the raw data for eventual use in the monthly productivity analysis report for the shift. The information is divided into two control areas: 1) items that the employee has no control over (e.g., assignments from dispatchers, such as calls for service, incident reports taken, accidents worked, and alarms responded to) and 2) areas that the officer has total control over (e.g., contacts with citizens or violators, citations written, warnings issued, and arrests made). Each agency can make its own assessment of which functions fit into each category and design its daily report accordingly. By examining these two control areas, departments can analyze an officer’s activities and compare them with the time afforded the individual to perform those duties.

In the daily activity report used by the Conway Police Department, the “criminal arrest” and “traffic arrest” sections represent the total control area, while “reports and calls” pertains to the no-control category. The “hours spent” portion reveals the total number of hours available for police patrol functions. Agencies must ensure that they retain documentation of every call and activity. The Conway Police Department keeps warnings in writing and records miscellaneous other calls in the narrative area of the daily report. Then, the items can be compared with the dispatch log to verify that personnel did not miss or drop any calls or attempt to pad their statistics with fictional activities. While it may seem time consuming to verify each officer’s daily report, this task requires only a small portion of the shift commander’s day.

Monthly Activity Report

The officer’s monthly activity report lists, by day, the totals from each section of the daily reports. Hours scheduled on duty usually will equal 40 per week, on 8- or 10-hour shifts, totaling between 160 to 190 per month. The number of hours available for police patrol activities equals those scheduled on duty minus those spent on detail. Departments may differ on what constitutes time on detail; the key is to apply a uniform standard for all personnel. The Conway Police Department considers time on detail as any activity that takes the officer away from normal patrol functions during the scheduled work day, excluding meal and rest breaks as officers remain subject to call at these times. Leave falls within this category and sick time is tracked separately to guard against possible abuse.

All items in the officer’s monthly report are totaled at the bottom. This information then becomes used in the monthly productivity analysis report for the shift.

Police Department Officer's Daily Activity Report

SHIFT REPORTS

Monthly Productivity Analysis Report by Shift