July 2002 Volume 71 Number 7

United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, DC 20535-0001

Robert S. Mueller III

Director

Contributors’ opinions and statements should not be considered an endorsement by the FBI for any policy, program, or service.

The attorney general has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the director of the Office of Management and Budget.

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

(ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

Editor

John E. Ott

Associate Editors

Cynthia L. Lewis Bunny S. Morris

Art Director

Denise Bennett Smith

Assistant Art Director

Stephanie L. Lowe

Staff Assistant

Linda W. Szumilo

This publication is produced by members of the Law Enforcement Communication Unit, William T. Guyton, chief.

Internet Address leb@fbiacademy.edu

Cover Photo

©  George Godoy

Send article submissions to Editor,

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room 209, Quantico, VA 22135.

Features

Departments

Dealing with Domestic Violence in Law Enforcement Relationships
By KAREN J. KRUGER, J.D., and NICHOLAS G. VALLTOS, M.A.

©  Don Ennis

     Domestic violence remains a prevalent social and law enforcement problem in the United States, and the public demands that law enforcement agencies work aggressively to prevent it. Sadly, several studies show that too many law enforcement officers themselves commit acts of domestic abuse,¹ which is not only devastating to the families of these officers but also damaging to the agencies and communities that they serve. This unlawful behavior undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the officer and diminishes the standards of the department and the profession.²

     As law enforcement responds to the demands of the community for stronger enforcement of domestic violence laws, it cannot ignore those within its own ranks who commit the same offenses. Law enforcement managers must respond when domestic violence occurs within the ranks—to enforce the law, to protect the integrity and reputation of the agency, and to reflect the ethical standard of stewardship expected of law enforcement leaders.

     Responding appropriately and adequately when domestic violence hits “home” often is not as easy as it may sound. The problem comprises many issues and requires a comprehensive approach, involving leadership, recruitment screening, policies and procedures, training, and violation investigation and response. As always, because state and local laws may vary, readers should consult their legal advisors before embarking on a new departmental policy and response plan. Be forewarned, however, law enforcement administrators should not delay in implementing such a plan. The next family tragedy could fall squarely on anyone’s doorstep.

July 2002 / 1

Ms. Kruger is an assistant attorney general for the state of Maryland in Baltimore.	Major Valltos recently retired from the Prince Georges’ County, Maryland, Police Department.

Step One: Leadership

     Effective law enforcement executives lead both by example and by setting clear expectations for the behavior of those who serve under them. The first step in establishing an effective intradepartmental response to domestic violence involves the leader demonstrating intolerance for such behavior, speaking out against it, and standing as an advocate for those who are harmed by it. Leaders’ public policies, established for enforcement by the officers in their communities, must remain consistent with those that they establish for their law enforcement personnel.

    Domestic violence has many faces and harms many victims. It proves critical that administrators’ messages address all of the forms of prohibited conduct to place all personnel fairly on notice and to deter all family violence. To have an effective message, managers must have a good understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence.

    Domestic violence is defined, in part, by the nature of the relationship between two individuals and, in part, by the conduct of the offender. It includes abuse inflicted on spouses; children; older or otherwise vulnerable adults, including parents; and any other persons similarly situated to a spouse, child, or parent. The abusive conduct may be physical, sexual, emotional, or financial.

     The behaviors identified as domestic violence are varied, but have several common unique characteristics.³ First, it occurs within an intimate relationship. Officers may commit physical violence against a family member that they never would consider inflicting on a criminal suspect, in part, because of the perceived “safety” of the intimate relationship. Second, domestic violence is a learned behavior; it cannot be attributed to genetics, illness, use of alcohol or other drugs, or stress, although these elements may increase the likelihood that violence will occur. Behavior is learned and reinforced as an acceptable, or even expected, way of behaving toward family members. Finally, domestic violence is recurrent and generally follows a cycle and involves various abusive behaviors.

     Keeping all of this in mind, law enforcement administrators must explore ways of helping their employees avoid violence in their personal relationships. To have an effective approach to officer-involved domestic violence, managers must begin with—

• a good understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and the magnitude of the problem;
  
• a commitment to addressing the problem and the support of other top members in doing so;
  
• an ability to create a culture of disapproval of abusive behavior and the means to communicate that position; and
  
• the resources to follow through on the commitment.
  

Step Two: Recruitment Screening and Background Investigations

     Ironically, individuals who make good law enforcement officers often share some personality traits with those who batter or abuse their family members, such as the inclination to maintain control in emotional and tense circumstances, the tendency to establish a position of power and authority, and the physical presence to use weapons and other methods of physical control when needed.⁴ However, every police recruit also must demonstrate the ability to recognize and curtail inappropriate, aggressive behavior. Those who cannot must be screened out during the recruitment process.

     Because domestic abuse is a learned behavior, effective background investigations, including a polygraph examination and a medical/psychological screening, can help identify potential or current batterers. The background investigation must include a thorough interview with all immediate family members to determine the existence of any domestic violence during the potential recruit officer’s formative years. The applicant investigator must probe this extremely delicate and private matter with sensitivity and understanding. Because of the learned behavior aspect of domestic violence, this line of questioning proves absolutely essential because it represents one of the best predictors of possible future domestic violence.⁵ Investigators should question each family member in a limited but direct manner, using appropriate follow-up questions as necessary. Some pertinent questions include the following:

Have you ever been the victim of domestic violence?

Have you ever witnessed an act of domestic violence

against a member of your immediate family?

Are you aware of an act of domestic violence committed by a member of your immediate family against anyone?

An affirmative answer to any of these questions may not suffice as the sole basis for disqualifying an applicant. However, it provides another avenue for the applicant investigator to explore and certainly is an area that the investigator should share with the mental health professional conducting the psychological evaluation of the applicant.

Step Three: Policies and Regulations

     To institutionalize an agency’s “zero tolerance” for domestic violence, administrators must have legally based policies and regulations (e.g., “General Orders”) in place to articulate their agency’s position. Additionally, the policy should state clearly and succinctly the potential punishment and other repercussions for any violation associated with domestic abuse matters, including the agency’s intended administrative response, how it will deal with court orders, and the necessity of psychological follow-up.

     In general, agencies can and should have simple and straightforward policies. Two standard regulations will apply to most of these situations: conduct unbecoming and failure to conform to law. Agencies also should promulgate regulations that are specific to domestic abuse, in part, to underscore its significance and to serve as a deterrent.⁶

     Agencies should require officers to immediately report any instances in which they are the respondent to any ex parte protective and peace order, and the supervisor should make appropriate command notification. At the command level, managers should determine investigative responsibility: first-line supervisor or internal affairs, depending on the seriousness of the alleged conduct. Investigators should begin with in-person visits to the victims to ensure their safety and to promptly collect any evidence related to officer misconduct. Administrators also must make a decision concerning the seizure of any department-issued equipment, especially firearms, from a liability standpoint. At this point, involved officers should receive a psychological referral prior to returning to duty. Agencies also should consider reciprocal agreements with surrounding jurisdictions to ensure timely, official notification of officer-involved domestic violence.

July 2002 / 3

Step Four: Training

     The key to any long-term strategy in preventing domestic violence is based on training. To institutionalize an agency’s zero tolerance for domestic violence, the department initially should train recruit officers in all aspects of domestic violence. Recruit officers should learn not only about the dynamics of domestic violence as it pertains to citizens but also, more specifically, about the silent problem of officer-involved domestic violence. As officers progress in their careers, they should have the lessons they learned in basic training reinforced through periodic in-services.

     This emerging phenomenon of officer-involved domestic violence has placed on-duty officers in confrontation with other police officers who are overwhelmed by a personal crisis situation. The calm professional demeanor usually displayed by the participant officer now may be replaced with the emotionally distraught bearing of an individual who may not be thinking in a rational manner.

     To better prepare officers for this phenomenon, training must cover a broad spectrum of activities, including response, tactics, and officer safety. Classroom instruction should encompass the origin and history of domestic violence and should include a history of officer-involved domestic violence, perhaps using adjudicated departmental cases generically to ensure confidentiality. The field strategies and techniques in which the officers are trained should be aimed at officer and participant safety. The use of role-playing and group forums represent excellent training models that interactively involve officers in diffusing and mediating domestic iolence. In addition, some law enforcement executives, who would say that they “think outside the box,” should assign new police officers to work several hours taking hotline calls at their local domestic violence crisis center.

     Employing trained practitioners (whether in-house employee assistance personnel or private mental health providers) as instructors and facilitators brings resources and experience, in a theoretical sense, that range from general to specific relevance of domestic violence. The use of these same practitioners in family and group orientations constitutes an excellent, nonthreatening outreach model to educate the families of recruit officers, as well as veteran officers, in intervention, resolution, and prevention strategies.

     In-service and roll-call training should reinforce the initial instruction that all officers receive, with updates that focus on contemporary issues and trends in domestic violence. Once again, trained practitioners should present the information because of their unique insight into personal crisis situations. The incorporation of a “practitioner” approach gives the officers significantly more tools in their arsenal and could create a new foundation of how they, as law enforcement professionals, can handle domestic calls more effectively.

     The practitioner also can prove invaluable in the area of supervisory and command in-service training, providing an overview of how to conduct basic crisis assessment that can lead to a more appropriate avenue of referral. This important step, in the initial stages of domestic violence situations, could represent the most effective vehicle, short of physical arrest, at an agency’s disposal by which it can mitigate, and actually prevent, officer-involved domestic violence. Supervisors also must learn to recognize the risk factors and behavioral clues that people who are abused or are committing abuse commonly exhibit. It is, in the first instance, the supervisor’s responsibility to monitor such factors and to refer employees for appropriate counseling, education, and support as an early intervention technique.

4 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Step Five: Violation Investigations

     The passage of new laws and the increased media attention on the number of officer-involved domestic violence cases has prompted police administrators to critically assess their agencies’ responses to this emerging crisis. Every agency should respond with a comprehensive approach to the underlying problems and not merely with a superficial quick fix.

     Depending upon the unique circumstances of each case, agencies should have their internal affairs personnel immediately conduct an inquiry into the facts of the case. The results of this inquiry will dictate the need for a formal internal investigation. This investigation should follow established agency protocol for criminal misconduct cases. If criminal charges are pending, the prosecutor’s office should screen the case; if the prosecutor declines to prosecute, the investigator should obtain a written declination.

     If and when criminal or administrative charges are imposed, agencies must suspend involved officers’ police powers and reclaim their weapons and departmental vehicles. Administrators should order that these officers be placed in an off-duty status and that they receive psychological evaluations to determine their fitness for any type of duty.

     If the psychologist determines that the officers are fit for duty, agencies may transfer them from leave to noncontact assignments until the criminal charges are adjudicated. Internal affairs investigators should attend all hearings related to the cases to ensure that the agencies remain aware of all case developments. If agencies contemplate restoring the officers to full duty prior to the adjudication of administrative charges, if any, they should undertake such a decision cautiously and in concert with their psychological examiners, internal affairs personnel, the officers’ commanders, and legal advisors.

Officers are trained to separate the domestic complaintants to hear both sides of the story. The officers position themselves so they can see each other during the encounter and will later compare notes to determine a fair and safe outcome

.

     If officers return to full duty during the course of a criminal or internal investigation, their supervisors should conduct periodic follow-ups to ensure that the officers fully comply with any applicable court orders. Administrators may find it prudent to issue a personnel order that concurs with, or even exceeds, the terms of a court order or stands in the place of such orders. If officers violate these standing orders, agencies immediately should suspend these officers from duty and initiate an investigation into charges of insubordination, if appropriate.

Step Six: Violation Responses

     If a deliberate, proactive investigation establishes evidence that an officer has committed acts of domestic abuse, agencies must take prompt and effective disciplinary action. In many jurisdictions, agencies can impose disciplinary action only after they have prescribed an administrative, evidentiary hearing. To be effective, agencies must consider certain details to ensure a successful administrative prosecution.

     If the suspect officer has been charged criminally, the administrator and legal advisor may determine that it is wise to defer an administrative investigation until the criminal prosecution is completed. However, even in the interim, the agency must take steps to both protect its administrative investigation and guard against liability while the criminal charges are pending. If the administrator decides not to delay the administrative investigation, the agency must keep it separate from the criminal case.⁷

     While either the criminal or the administrative investigation remains pending, the agency must consider whether the facts indicate that it should revoke the officer’s police powers or suspend the officer from duty, pending resolution. Generally, an agency should suspend the police powers of any officer who is under investigation for credible or substantial allegations of domestic violence. Multiple reasons underlie this recommendation.

July 2002 / 5

   First, applicable court orders in a given case may prohibit a respondent officer from possessing a firearm as long as the order is in effect, thereby prohibiting the officer from performing some essential job functions. Second, officers embroiled in domestic problems may be tempted to misuse their police powers and equipment in a misguided—or even criminal—effort to manage those problems. Such inappropriate actions could create civil liability for agencies. Third, the public may suspect the integrity, impartiality, and effectiveness of an officer under investigation for domestic abuse. It particularly would be inappropriate for such officers to respond to domestic calls.

     Agencies also should prepare the administrative prosecution under the assumption that the victim of the domestic abuse will be unable or unwilling to testify against the abuser.⁸ It is all too common a feature of domestic abuse situations that once an acute episode is over, a “honeymoon phase” occurs in the relationship, causing the victim to rethink punishing the abuser.⁹ However, if the internal affairs investigators have followed the same steps as criminal investigators would have under the circumstances and obtained the necessary evidence, such as reporting to the scene on the initial call, securing the 911 audio tape, taking crime scene and follow-up photographs, obtaining statements, and collecting documents and court transcripts, an administrative prosecutor can prepare and present a successful case.

     Following adjudication of the misconduct charges, administrators must determine the appropriate punishment. If the officer suffered a criminal conviction from the underlying domestic events, termination of employment is appropriate in nearly every case.¹⁰ Moreover, a zero tolerance policy would seem to dictate that dismissal constitutes the expected punishment absent some compelling mitigating circumstances. In other words, it is the unusual case in which the officer should not be fired.

Step Seven: Related Problems and Concerns

     Responses to officer-involved domestic violence/disturbance cases pose a variety of problems for the law enforcement administrator. How the responding officers handle the unique situation in which a fellow officer is a suspect represents one of the most significant. The response to these calls is far from routine and, in fact, should trigger a higher level of caution in responding officers.

     However, many officers feel that they can reason with their fellow officer who is involved in a domestic dispute. Responding officers seem to fail to realize that they are not dealing with a rational, level-headed law enforcement officer, but, rather, a police officer, man or woman, engaged in a fight with a “significant other” and overwhelmed with heated emotion. The involved officer knows every tactic and ploy and may have received the same, if not more, specialized training than the responding officers and may outrank them. The involved officer has ready access to a service weapon, as well as other defensive weapons, such as pepper spray, that the officer could use offensively. And, the involved officer invariably knows that the domestic events could result in dismissal from the agency. Often, the victim is aware of this probability as well.

     Administrators have an obligation to institutionalize agency response to officer-involved domestic violence/disturbance cases and support the officers who attend to these calls. In addition to the basic reports, appropriate supervisory and command notification, whether the officer is employed with the responding agency or not, should occur. Agencies should mandate this notification, with variations to the reporting procedures by supervisory approval only.

     If an agency allows its officers to treat officer-involved domestic violence/disturbance cases differently from those involving other citizens, the agency could face serious liability issues—specifically, allegations of deliberate indifference with regard to the victim’s well-being. If officer-involved domestic violence becomes more prevalent, the agency needs to enhance proactive strategies in handling and reporting protocols.

6 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

    Citizens, as well as law enforcement employees, demand the best from those who direct public safety activities. Promoting effective policies and contingencies to personal crises within law enforcement’s ranks is the least that the profession can do to better serve everyone.

Conclusion

     While domestic violence creates a repugnant reaction in every civilized human being, the thought that those who protect and serve the public also may participate in such offenses goes beyond most people’s comprehension. Unfortunately, this proves true in all too many cases. The law enforcement community must unite in an effort to eradicate such behavior from its ranks not only to restore the public’s faith and trust in the profession but, more important, to show that it will not tolerate such actions by any individual, regardless of position or authority.

     Law enforcement agencies can implement several strategies to combat domestic violence in their ranks. Most require a comprehensive approach that includes effective leadership, recruitment screening, straightforward policies and procedures, appropriate training, and efficient violation investigation and response. By incorporating such actions into their daily efforts, agencies can safeguard its members and their families from the toll that domestic violence takes on the law enforcement community and the citizens it serves.

Endnotes

     ⁵ Stephen F. Curran, Ph.D., “Law Enforcement Response to Domestic Violence Committed by Police Officers: Pre-Employment Selection,” lecture at annual conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, November 2000; Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thomas, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey (Washington, DC, July 2000); Douglas R. Marvin, “The Dynamics of Domestic Abuse,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 1997, 13-18.

     ⁶ See a model policy endorsed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Officer-Involved Domestic Violence Model Policy,” IACP National Law Enforcement: A Compilation of Model Policies, Volume IV, Section 77, April 1, 1999; and as a state model, see the “Model Regulation for Law Enforcement Agencies Relating to Domestic Violence Committed by Law Enforcement Officers” issued in 1997 by the Legal Advisors Committee to the Maryland Chiefs of Police Association.

⁷ Supra note 6 (IACP).

     ⁸ George Wattendorf, “Prosecuting Cases Without Victim Cooperation,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 1996, 18-20.

     ⁹ Douglas R. Marvin, “The Dynamics of Domestic Abuse,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 1997, 13-18.

     ¹⁰ Under 18 U.S.C. 922 (g) (9), a person who is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition.

The opinions expressed in this article are the authors and not those of the Maryland attorney general or his staff.

     Wanted: Notable Speeches

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin seeks transcripts of presentations made by criminal justice professionals for its Notable Speech department. Anyone who has delivered a speech recently and would like to share the information with a wider audience may submit a transcript of the presentation to the Bulletin for consideration.

    As with article submissions, the Bulletin staff will edit the speech for length and clarity, but, realizing that the information was presented orally, maintain as much of the original flavor as possible. Presenters should submit their transcripts typed and double-spaced on 8 ¹ / ₂ - by 11-inch white paper with all pages numbered. When possible, an electronic version of the transcript saved on computer disk should accompany the document. Send the material to:

Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

FBI Academy Madison Building, Room 209 Quantico, VA 22135 telephone: 703-632-1952, e-mail: leb@fbiacademy.edu

July 2002 / 7

©  Mark C. Ide

By ANTHONY J. PINIZZOTTO, Ph.D., EDWARD F. DAVIS, M.A., and CHARLES E. MILLER III

     On a rainy November night in a large southern city, a uniformed patrol officer, 38 years of age with less than 12 years of law enforcement service, was assigned to a one-person, marked patrol vehicle. He received a radio broadcast to respond to assist other officers working a burglary assignment at a local school. The responding officer heard the officers on the scene request help after they observed a male inside the school. He then realized that this was not just another accidental burglary alarm that frequently goes off on rainy nights.

     The rain was the first the city had received in over a month, making the asphalt streets very slick. The officer activated his emergency equipment and headed toward the school. At a curve in the roadway, the officer lost control of his vehicle and slid into a tree. He never arrived at the school; he was killed on impact. It took rescue personnel several hours to cut the officer out of the vehicle. The accident reconstruction team estimated his speed at less than 50 miles per hour. This was within the speed limit, but unsafe for the existing road conditions at that time. The officer’s death was very traumatic for his department, fellow officers, and the community he served.

     Unfortunately, this type of incident is not isolated, and statistics reflect that these types of accidental deaths are increasing throughout the United States.¹ In the past two decades, 1,407 officers have died feloniously in the United States while 1,362 officers have died accidentally. However, in 1998, a startling change in this trend began to emerge. The number of accidental line-of-duty deaths surpassed the number of officers killed by felons. A dramatic shift in 1998 showed that 20 more officers died in accidents (81) than due to criminal action (61). This climb continued in 1999 with 23 more officers dying accidentally (65 to 42) and culminated in 2000 with 33 more officers losing their lives in accidents than in felonious incidents (84 versus 51).
    These numbers become more disturbing and of even greater concern when seen in a broader context. Many officers are involved in various types of on-duty accidents that do not result in their death. Unacceptable numbers of these officers are confined to beds, wheelchairs, or otherwise totally disabled. Many others, although not totally disabled, will never work in law enforcement again. Moreover, most officers personally know at least one fellow officer disabled through some type of on-duty accident. Clearly, the law enforcement community must examine ways to reduce these tragedies that increasingly are decimating its ranks.

8 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO ACCIDENTAL DEATHS

     The authors’ experiences and research suggest that many factors have contributed to reducing the number of felonious deaths over recent years.³ These include improved training practices and procedures and increased supervision directed toward safety concerns during high-risk tactical situations.

     To try and uncover what has led to the dramatic increase in accidental line-of-duty deaths, the authors examined 5 years (1996-2000) of data pertaining to these incidents. They had a twofold purpose: first, to describe similarities and differences that surfaced during the examination of accidents that resulted in the deaths of law enforcement officers and, second, to raise a number of questions and issues that officers and administrators should consider to reduce the number of officers accidentally killed in the line of duty.

     The authors used data from the FBI’s annual Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) report, which contains statistics not only regarding felonious killings but also information about accidental deaths. An analysis of the circumstances in relation to these accidental deaths indicated several factors that the authors compared with the results of their earlier research regarding felonious deaths and assaults. In these previous studies, behavioral descriptors surfaced for officers feloniously killed and assaulted, including being hardworking, not following departmental rules, and tending to perceive themselves as service oriented.

     Currently, no behavioral descriptors exist for officers who have died accidentally. However, after reviewing annual LEOKA data and interviewing a limited number of peers and supervisors of officers accidentally killed, the authors found that several characteristics emerged. These included a certain mind-set of some officers who think, “It will never happen to me,” regarding the possibility of an accidental, duty-related death. These officers seemed to possess an increasing feeling of invincibility when inside a departmental vehicle. A sense of invincibility often accompanies a higher level of risk-taking behavior. For example, one officer, off duty and driving home in his cruiser, observed a disabled vehicle in an ice storm. The officer stopped in the middle of the highway to determine if the driver needed help and was struck accidentally and killed by a vehicle that had lost control. Consistent with the attributes of officers killed and assaulted in the line of duty, this officer was hardworking and service oriented.

     These descriptors pertain to the majority of officers, regardless of their age or years in law enforcement. However, when combined with other factors that the authors have uncovered, these attributes can increase the potential of an accidental fatality. The other factors include an officer’s particular level of performance comfort and a lack of in-service training.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 2000 (Washington, DC, 2001), 64.

July 2002 / 9

Increasing Comfort Level

     Officers develop a particular level of performance comfort, or a “comfort zone,” by successfully completing various law enforcement tasks over an extended period of time. This comfort zone interacts with their sense of invincibility, enabling officers to take greater risks. These risk-taking behaviors often result in successful outcomes that, in turn, lead to commendations by their agencies for performance above and beyond the call of duty. The greater the risk, the higher the reward. Hardworking officers who observe coworkers win such awards attempt to increase their productivity by learning shortcuts that often involve greater risk-taking behaviors.

     Because these officers have succeeded in these high-risk situations for many years, their sense that an accidental fatality “will never happen to me” increases. In 1996, researchers examined 246 situations of law enforcement vehicle pursuits.⁴ They concluded that veteran officers were more likely to engage in pursuit of misdemeanor property crime suspects under high-risk conditions than were their less-experienced counterparts.

Diminishing Physical Skills

     Operating a police vehicle involves a set of physical skills that officers develop during academy training. Unlike weapon proficiency, where a set of physical skills continually are reinforced through in-service training programs, driving skills rarely, if ever, are augmented through in-service training. This lack of periodic training leads to an eventual erosion of the motor skills needed for emergency driving. One study stated, “Although many police officers and supervisors recognize the inherent dangers of pursuit and are making efforts to control them, this study reveals a lack of initial and continuing training on the issues involved.”⁵

10 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

REDUCING ACCIDENTAL DEATHS

     In the authors’ previous studies of felonious deaths and assaults on officers, training surfaced as a key factor in reducing the number of felonious deaths and assaults.⁹ In reviewing data on accidental deaths, they found that no easy answers exist to the complicated problem of reducing accidental deaths in the law enforcement profession. Rather, they discovered questions, considerations, and factors for agencies to consider within the scope of their own department’s size, area of patrol, number and kinds of vehicles, budget, and demographics. Overall, four main issues emerged as needing review: training procedures and tactics, safety supervision, equipment checks, and further data analysis.

Training Procedures

     Basic motor vehicle training has helped law enforcement recruits develop successful and safe driving skills. As in other areas of law enforcement safety, agencies should tailor the specifics of training to address their own needs. For example, agencies should use national law enforcement data on accidental deaths only as a point of reference when making decisions that affect local training needs. Weather conditions; roadway construction; volume of vehicular and pedestrian traffic; jurisdictional/geographic size; diverse sizes, types, and manufacturers of vehicles employed; and different departmental policies represent variations that agencies should consider. Managers first should analyze their own department’s accidents, as well as those from similar jurisdictions, to identify correctly areas where training will provide the greatest benefit to the patrol officer.

     The results of these analyses can assist law enforcement managers in identifying important problems that they can address through in-service training. Common areas of concern may include, but are not be limited to, the following:

• Is speed a primary contributing factor?
  
• What particular shift or time of day do the accidents generally occur?
  
• Is fatigue (perhaps resulting from tour of duty, court attendance, overtime, or part-time employment) a possible factor?
  
• Does a correlation exist between vehicular deaths and officer activity type (e.g., patrol, emergency assistance, nonemergency assignment, vehicle pursuits, or traffic stops)?
  

Safety Supervision

     Subsequent to an accidental, as well as a felonious, death of an officer, many questions occur. Should the officer have initiated a vehicular chase? Should the officer have given or requested more information from the dispatcher before engaging emergency equipment? Should the officer have stopped the chase earlier? Did the officer follow all established policies and guidelines? With closer, timely, and aggressive supervision, some of these questions can be addressed during the activity in question.

July 2002 / 11

     When supervisors closely monitor activities within their location, they are more aware of possible dangers that might be reduced before an officer is hurt or killed. This in no way removes the necessary discretion that officers should have in their everyday work. Rather, what supervision might offer is a more objective evaluation of the set of circumstances that has turned into a highly emotional and volatile scene. Agencies should answer some basic questions to discover how they can provide their officers with the best supervision to ensure their safety.

• Have agency managers written and implemented policies for the safe operation of motor vehicles (e.g., the mandatory wearing of seat belts)?
  
• Do the written policies clearly specify the type of radio assignments designated as emergency situations?
  
• Do the written policies clearly define when officers may conduct high-speed pursuits and when they must discontinue them?
  
• Do all supervisors enforce these written policies?
  
• Does the agency reevaluate and alter the policies as needed?
  
• Do supervisors ensure that departmental vehicles are inspected regularly and are in compliance with local safety regulations?
• Do supervisors of officers regularly monitor emergency dispatched assignments and individual responses?
  
• Do supervisors respond to and monitor proper vehicle placement and stop location selection sites for personnel?
  
• Do supervisors ensure that officers attend periodic safety-related in-service training?
  

      Traditionally, equipment checks of vehicles in many departments merely meant that sergeants noted when cruisers or patrol cars received regular service. This frequently covered only such items as changing the oil, ensuring that emergency equipment functioned properly, and repairing major observable damage to the vehicle. Recently, however, a more aggressive approach to vehicle maintenance has begun to entail not only the vehicle but also how an officer operates the vehicle. Supervisors need to become more alert to the dangers in which officers sometimes place themselves by improperly using their vehicles, a tool that sometimes can cause more damage than the weapons they carry. In addition, law enforcement officials and managers should become aware of potential hazards that added features on vehicles (or their absence) could present to officers.

• Are departmental vehicles purchased based on price or safety considerations?
  
• Are airbags safer than harness restraints?
  
• Are vehicles equipped with side air bags necessarily any safer?
  
• Are electronic door locks a help or hindrance in an accident?
  
  

12 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

• Is the location of the fuel source of the vehicle acceptable by national safety standards?
  
• Are antilock braking systems required for agency vehicles?
  
• Is the installation of governors (speed regulators) on agency vehicles feasible, acceptable, desirable, or counterproductive?
  
• Would wearing a safety helmet by officers operating agency vehicles significantly decrease their chances for injury?
  

Data Analysis

     Differences in the size, type, and location of law enforcement agencies allow for only general recommendations and guidelines regarding the safe use of vehicles in law enforcement. Therefore, agencies should research and analyze what is occurring within their own departments. Agencies of any size might benefit from developing a working relationship with local colleges, universities, and technical institutes to collect and analyze various aspects of the complex phenomenon of accidental deaths in law enforcement. Such institutions may have fresh and innovative insights into this problem. The more information gathered and analyzed, the greater the likelihood that appropriate and applicable answers may be found and, ultimately, result in lives saved.

CONCLUSION

     When law enforcement officers die in the performance of their duties, their agencies, their families and fellow officers, and the communities they serve suffer greatly. While those deaths attributed to criminals represent truly tragic occurrences, those caused by accidents, especially vehicle accidents, often create the additional heartache of unresolved issues about the reasons for these incidents. In the former, agencies capture the offenders and the court system renders justice. In the latter, who resolves an “accident?” The officer is just as dead; the family is just as devastated; the loss is just as tragic, perhaps even more so because it may have been preventable.

     Everyone within the law enforcement community hopes that the day will arrive when felonious killings, serious assaults, and accidental deaths are only a part of law enforcement’s history. However, realistically, the profession accepts the sad, but inevitable, reality that deaths and assaults will continue to occur. Although they may continue, law enforcement agencies, local governments, civic groups, and academic institutions can work toward reducing their number by analyzing past incidents, developing new training procedures, and reminding officers of the dangers inherent in the profession. The dedicated men and women of law enforcement who tirelessly serve and protect the public deserve no less.

Endnotes

     ¹ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 2000 (Washing-ton, DC, 2001).

² Ibid.

     ³ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Killed in the Line of Duty (Washington, DC, 1992); and Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller III, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, In the Line of Fire (Washington, DC, 1997).

     ⁴ Geoffrey P. Alpert, Dennis Kenny, Roger Dunham, William Smith, and Michael Cosgrove, U.S. Department of Justice, Institute of Justice,

Police Pursuit and the Use of Force (Washington, DC, 1996).

     ⁵ Geoffrey P. Alpert, U.S. Department of Justice, Police Pursuit: Policies and Training, Research in Brief (Washington, DC, 1997), 7.

⁶ Supra note 1, 73. ⁷ Supra note 1, 64. ⁸ Supra note 1, 64. ⁹ Supra note 3.

Dr. Pinizzotto is a clinical forensic psychologist in the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy. Mr. Davis is an instructor in the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy. Mr. Miller is an instructor with the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia.

July 2002 / 13

High-Speed Police Pursuits

Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction

     High-speed police pursuits and the inherent risk of injury and death that can result constitute an important law enforcement and public safety issue. Police pursuits are dangerous. Available data indicate that the number of pursuits continues to increase, as well as the number of pursuit-related injuries and deaths. A traffic accident constitutes the most common terminating event in an urban pursuit,¹ and most people agree that these pursuits should be controlled. Yet, researchers note a widespread lack of accurate data on the subject.

     Officers face the basic dilemma associated with high-speed pursuits of fleeing suspects: Do the benefits of potential apprehension outweigh the risks of endangering the public and the police?² Research indicates that too many restraints placed on the police regarding pursuits can put the public at risk.³ On the other hand, insufficient controls on police pursuit can result in needless accidents and injuries.

The Dangers of Pursuit

     The interpretation of the term “pursuit-related crash” represents one common police practice that affects accuracy of reporting. Often, police officers or their agencies will make the determination that a crash occurred right after a pursuit was “terminated,” hence the crash is not pursuit-related. Agencies immediately can determine if this occurred by replaying tapes of radio transmissions during the pursuit, even days after completing a comprehensive accident investigation or reconstruction. Either way, the process can be very subjective.

     Some research indicates that police pursuits result in about 350 deaths per year and the number of pursuits increases each year.⁴ One organization estimates that about 2,500 persons die each year as a result of police pursuits and that another 55,000 are injured.⁵ Although some law enforcement sources argue that these estimates are exaggerated, they concede that the 350 figure may be too low.

14 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

     The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported that 314 people were killed during pursuits in 1998. Of this total, 2 were police officers and 198 were individuals being chased. The remaining 114 were either occupants of unrelated vehicles or pedestrians.⁶ The total was higher in each of the 4 previous years.

     The lack of a mandatory reporting system hampers attempts by NHTSA to track pursuit fatalities and results in the collection of as little as one-half of the actual data.⁷ Typically, only 90 percent of states report pursuit fatality data to NHTSA. By extrapolating the 5-year totals to include 100 percent reporting, calculations would show an average of 375 deaths per year. Even conservative estimates by various researchers recalculate the actual number of fatalities between 400 to 500 deaths per year.

Mr. Hill, a retired New Jersey police officer, serves as an instructor of criminal justice at the University of Phoenix.

     Police pursuit records provide some frightening statistics. First, the majority of police pursuits involve a stop for a traffic violation.⁸ Second, one person dies every day as a result of a police pursuit.⁹ On average, from 1994 through 1998, one law enforcement officer was killed every 11 weeks in a pursuit,¹⁰ and 1 percent of all U.S. law enforcement officers who died in the line-of-duty lost their lives in vehicle pursuits.¹¹ Innocent third parties who just happened to be in the way constitute 42 percent of persons killed or injured in police pursuits.¹² Further, 1 out of every 100 high-speed pursuits results in a fatality.¹³

     Research indicates that pursuits become dangerous quite quickly. For example, 50 percent of all pursuit collisions occur in the first 2 minutes of the pursuit, and more than 70 percent of all collisions occur before the sixth minute of the pursuit.¹⁴ Although the public sympathizes with the law enforcement community’s position on pursuits, they do not want to be placed in harm’s way. Public support for pursuits decreases as the severity of the offense that led to the chase decreases.¹⁵ One study found that 58 percent of people interviewed reported that police act correctly when they pursue a motorist who does not stop.¹⁶ When asked if the police act correctly when the pursuit endangers public safety, support decreased by one-half to 29 percent. Almost two-thirds (64 percent) of respondents said that they felt police overreact sometimes or very often when pursuing motorists who do not stop.¹⁷ To decrease the dangers associated with pursuit, agencies must increase training and ensure that they have clear pursuit policies.

Training and Policy

     A lack of training can increase risks of pursuit-related injuries. Only recently has classroom instruction included training on vehicle pursuit tactics, policy, and liability. Previously, agencies taught pursuit-driving techniques behind the wheel without accompanying classroom training. Officers learned how to pursue but not when to pursue. Inadequate or inapplicable training often resulted, and officers rarely followed training in actual practice. Law enforcement must approach pursuit training similar to firearms training. For example, for every hour agencies spend on training officers how to shoot, they also spend several hours teaching when to shoot.¹⁸

The training deficiency trend has changed in the past few years. Although many agencies have increased or added pursuit training, most have done so only for new officers at the police academy. Therefore, most veteran officers, with their academy days far behind them, lack contemporary pursuit training.

July 2002 / 15

     Training should teach officers the phenomena present while they pursue. Tunnel vision makes them oblivious to what is going on around them. Some 96 percent of officers involved in a pursuit focus on catching the violator “if it’s the last thing (they’ll) ever do.”¹⁹ Research shows that this holds true for many officers.²⁰

     While effective pursuit training can curtail certain dangerous situations, policy constitutes another important aspect in police pursuits.²¹ An overwhelming majority of police agencies implemented their pursuit policy in the 1970s.²² Although most of these same agencies modified their policies in the past 2 years by adding restrictions due to liability, problems remain. Insufficiencies still exist in data collection, reporting procedures, and accompanying accountability.²³

     One comprehensive study shows that officers can use termination as an effective option to reduce the risks of pursuits.²⁴ This study involved interviews of 146 jailed suspects who had been involved as drivers in high-speed chases. More than 70 percent of the suspects said that they would have slowed down if police had terminated the pursuit or even backed off a short distance.²⁵ Fifty-three percent of the suspects responded that they were willing to run at all costs from the police in a pursuit, and 64 percent believed they would not be caught.²⁶ While 71 percent said that they were concerned for their own safety, only 62 percent said that they were concerned for the safety of others.²⁷ Clearly, the police must be concerned with public safety during pursuits because the suspects are not.

     An integral part of pursuit training involves giving officers a clear understanding about the decision to terminate a pursuit. The Arkansas State Police recently created new pursuit training for state and local officers that stresses keeping pursuits under control and advises that termination is an option.²⁸

Alternatives to Pursuit

     The most effective way to reduce risks is to terminate a pursuit. Clearly, too many pursuits continue that officers obviously should have terminated. Research on pursuit data and statistics show that termination dramatically could reduce traffic accidents, fatalities, and injuries. Police must reevaluate their thinking and mission.²⁹ Agencies rarely can justify endangering the public to pursue a violator.

     Although many electronic devices still are being evaluated for effectiveness, technology also can decrease pursuit risks. Officers can carry spiked strips (or “stop sticks”) in their trunks and deploy them in the path of a fleeing suspect. The strips create a controlled loss of air (not a blowout) from the suspect’s tires. Once the violator crosses the strips, the deploying officer quickly pulls them from the roadway to allow pursuing police vehicles to pass. Agencies have begun to use these strips with increasing effectiveness. For example, departments in Cincinnati, Ohio, successfully used them after they sought risk-reduction techniques following a string of pursuit tragedies.³⁰ Similarly, the Ohio State Highway Patrol, the Utah Highway Patrol, and the Pennsylvania State Police also are reporting recent successful use of the spiked strips.

Fatalities in Crashes Involving Law Enforcement in Pursuit 1994–1998

Source: Fatality Analysis Reporting Systems ARF, National –Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, DC, 2000

16 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

     One electronics company is testing a radar warning system that police can activate that sends a signal to any motorist with a radar detector of an approaching police pursuit. Motorists then can pull over to the side of the road or otherwise get out of the way.

     Other technological ideas include an ultrasonic device that shoots a burst of microwave energy at a fleeing suspect. This causes the suspect vehicle’s electronic system to fail, thus immediately disabling the violator.³¹ Experts are studying a similar technology in which a robot-like cart jettisons from the front of the primary police pursuit vehicle. The cart then attempts to overtake the fleeing vehicle and electronically “zaps” the engine out of service. Researchers also are testing radio-technologic devices (similar to stolen car tracking systems) that electronically would disable the fleeing vehicle.³² Agencies have used helicopters with good results in pursuits, in parts of California and in cities, such as Baltimore, Maryland; Miami, Florida; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The versatility, range, and vantage point of the helicopter allows ground officers to decrease the use of high-speed pursuits and increase apprehension rates.³³ With a helicopter observing the suspect, ground units can slow down and retreat to reduce accident risks. While most agencies cannot afford their own helicopter, they can develop regional interagency assistance plans.     

Most experts agree that increased criminal penalties also will reduce pursuits. Individuals who elude and flee the police should face severe criminal penalties. Consequently, some states have made eluding a second-degree crime.³⁴

Conclusion

     High-speed police pursuits constitute an important public safety issue. Research clearly indicates the dangers associated with these pursuits. While some are necessary, many are not. Curtailing unnecessary pursuits can reduce the inherent risks associated with this dangerous practice.

     Law enforcement agencies should provide appropriate pursuit training to recruits during their instruction at police academies, as well as to seasoned officers. Additionally, police administrators should ensure that their department’s pursuit policy provides clear guidance and they should make use of available technology that can aid in safer pursuits. Taking such initiatives can help departments increase the effectiveness of pursuits while simultaneously reducing the risks involved to citizens and officers.

Endnotes

     ¹ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatality Analysis Reporting Systems – ARF, Fatalities in Crashes Involving Law Enforcement in Pursuit 1998 (Washington, DC, 2000).

     ² G. P. Alpert, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Police Pursuit: Policies and Training (Washington, DC, May 1997).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Supra note 2.

     ⁵ R. Van Sant, “High-Speed Chases: Mayhem on the Street,” The Cincinnati Post, May 19, 1998.

⁶ Supra note 1.

     ⁷ D. P. Van Blaricom, “He Flees—To Pursue or Not to Pursue: That is the Question,” Police 22, no. 11, (1998).

⁸ Supra note 2. ⁹ Supra note 1.

¹⁰  Supra note 1.

     ¹¹ In the Line of Duty: Police Pursuits Prove Deadly, (National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund: Washington, DC, 1997).

¹²  Supra note 7.

     ¹³ D. Falcone, “Police Pursuit: In Pursuit of Policy, The Empirical Study, Volume II,” AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety (Washington, DC, 1992).

July 2002 / 17

     ¹⁴ G. P. Alpert, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Pursuit Management Task Force Report (Washington, DC, 1998).

¹⁵  Supra note 2.

     ¹⁶ Criminal Justice Policy Foundation Survey IV: Police Pursuits, (Criminal Justice Policy Foundation: New Haven, CT, 1998).

¹⁷  Ibid.

¹⁸  Supra note 7.

¹⁹  Supra note 7.

     ²⁰ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed 1996 (Washington, DC, 1997).

²¹  Supra note 7.

²²  Supra note 2.

²³  Supra note 2.

²⁴  Supra note 2.

²⁵  Supra note 2.

²⁶  Supra note 2.

²⁷  Supra note 2.

     ²⁸ P. Hill, “Training, Stiffer Penalties Considered to Curb Pursuits,” Northwest Arkansas Times, December 14, 1997.

²⁹  Supra note 7.

³⁰  T. Bricking, “Flattened Tires End Chase,”

The Cincinnati Enquirer, June 2, 1997; T. Bricking, “Group Advocates Safer Pursuits,”

The Cincinnati Enquirer, June 21, 1997; and J. Prendergast, “Cops Pursuit Rules Vary,”

The Cincinnati Enquirer, June 17, 1997.

     ³¹ J. Hill, “Police Pursuits and The Risks to Bystanders,” doctoral program paper presented to Nova Southeastern University (Fort Lauderdale, FL, 1999).

³²  Ibid.

     ³³ G. P. Alpert, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Helicopters in Pursuit Operations (Washington, DC, August 1998).

³⁴  Supra note 31.

Snap Shot

Boat Accident

While on a boating trip on Indianapolis, Indiana’s White River, two couples and an infant hit an obstruction that damaged the propeller of their boat so extensively that it could not develop sufficient thrust to keep out of the strong current leading to the spillway. The boat went over the spillway and lodged as depicted in the photograph. Over the next several hours, multiple attempts to rescue the occupants by boat, rope pulley, and fire truck ladder proved unsuccessful. Two officers from the Indiana State Police arrived in the department’s helicopter and rescued all five people on the craft in less than 15 minutes.

Submitted by Indiana State Police

18 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Bulletin Reports

Victims

Juvenile Delinquency and Serious Injury Victimization (NCJ 188676) draws on data from two studies (the Denver Youth Survey and the Pittsburgh Youth Study) by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to explore the interrelationship between delinquency and victimization. This bulletin, part of OJJDP’s Youth Development Series, focuses on victims of violence who sustained serious injuries as a result of the victimization. Being victimized may lead to victimizing others. The studies found that many victims were prone to engage in illegal activities, associate with delinquent peers, victimize other delinquents, and avoid legal recourse in resolving conflicts. A clearer understanding of the patterns and predictors of victimization offers the potential for increased effectiveness in designing and implementing strategies to reduce both victimization and offending. For a copy of this report, call the National Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800- 851-3420 or access its Web site at http://www.ncjrs.org.

Grants/Funding

The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) presents theOVC National Directory of Victim Assistance Funding Opportunities 2001, which lists, by state and territory, the contact names, mailing addresses, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses for federal grant programs that provide assistance to crime victims. The directory includes information on grant programs that assist state and local agencies to prepare for and respond to incidents of domestic terrorism and criminal mass casualty. It also provides a complete listing of professional colleagues nationwide that state victim assistance program administrators can contact for helpful information. This OVC directory provides useful information to state and local organizations interested in applying for state or federal funding to support crime victim assistance programs. For a copy of this 266-page directory (NCJ 189218), call the National Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800-851-3420. It also is available electronically at http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/nrd/2001/welcome.html.

July 2002 / 19

Perspective

The Problem with Gratuities

By Mike White

“I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, political beliefs, aspirations, animosities, or friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities.”¹

     Until 1997, I was in charge of the Detective Bureau in Norwalk, Ohio, which is a relatively small town, but very professional and proactive. When I first came to the department in 1983, officers commonly accepted free coffee and discounted meals, along with other services. But, in 1991, a new chief was hired and these practices stopped.

     In 1997, the chief of police position opened in Monroeville, Ohio, the community where I grew up. The department is a small one in the Midwest that, like other departments, is experiencing a change in the culture of law enforcement. I applied for the chief position and was hired on September 1, 1997. I started under a blanket of controversy because I was the first chief that did not progress through the ranks of the Monroeville Police Department (MPD). This caused some resentment, but nothing compared with the response I received when I notified my officers that they were not to accept gratuities. While all agreed that they understood, many felt that I was interfering with long-standing practices. In fact, one officer informed me that accepting gratuities had been a benefit of working for the police department for the past 15 years and that he did not see any harm in accepting free or discounted items. He said that we work in a small town and that we need to take care of the locals who, in turn, will take care of us.

     Are law enforcement officers unethical to accept these gifts? What I saw as an unethical act was viewed by others, entrenched in the culture of the department, as an entitlement. Gratuity is something given voluntarily or beyond obligation usually for some service.² The issue becomes cloudy as to whether the acceptance of free coffee and free or discounted meals is actually, by definition, a gratuity. Even if the acceptance of free or discounted items is not classified officially as a gratuity, does this mean that its acceptance is ethically sound? What do officers think? What do community members think? What do the owners of the businesses offering the gratuities think?

20 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Discussion

     I have interviewed many police officers of various ranks within their departments about their views on what practices are ethical as they relate to gratuities.³ Some officers have departmental policies that state that officers can accept gratuities as long as they do not solicit them. Other officers draw distinctions between what is an allowed gratuity. For example, the cost of the item, the reason it is given, and the expectation associated with the item determines one officer’s opinion. Could ethical arguments of accepting gratuities be a matter of opinion, or are the acceptance of gratuities a community social act that should continue as a bridge between the community and the police? Varying opinions exist among officers, as well as in literature that I reviewed.

Chief White heads the Monroeville, Ohio, Police Department.

Arguments For and Against Gratuities

Allowing Gratuities

• They help create a friendly bond between officers and the public, thus fostering community-policing goals.
  
• They represent a nonwritten form of appreciation and usually are given with no expectation of anything in return.
  
• Most gratuities are too small to be a significant motivator of actions.
  
• The practice is so deeply entrenched that efforts to root it out will be ineffective and cause unnecessary violations of the rules.
  
• A complete ban makes officers appear as though they cannot distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe.
  
• Some businesses and restaurants insist on the practice.
  

Banning Gratuities

• The acceptance violates most departments’ policies and the law enforcement code of ethics.
  
• Even the smallest gifts create a sense of obligation.
  
• Even if nothing is expected in return, the gratuity may create an appearance of impropriety.
• Although most officers can discern between friendly gestures and bribes, some may not.
  
• They create an unfair distribution of services to those who can afford gratuities, voluntary taxing, or private funding of a public service.
  
• It is unprofessional.
  

    One officer asked me if I would turn down a cup of coffee offered by a friend or neighbor while off duty, and I answered no. Does this make it okay to accept one while on duty? I think that different rules apply while officers are on duty. Police officers represent their communities and have powers that regular citizens do not. The public has no way of knowing if the free coffee is given under subtle coercion.

     Another officer advised me that his agency’s policy states not to accept gratuities. However, if the shop owner becomes insistent, the agency’s policy states that officers should lay the money on the table to be used as a tip or payment and then leave the establishment. Differentiating between gratuities and corruption is not a clear concept. “Within the larger community of any police jurisdiction, the practice of exchanging gifts, swapping services, and extending professional ‘courtesies’ is accepted by all citizens. It is a normal part of business relations for a salesman to offer a bargain to a steady customer or for a manufacturer to obtain favorable advertising space on a magazine or newspaper by paying ‘extra.’ Employees on public payrolls also receive gifts for professional services rendered.”⁴

    The payment of free coffee and discounted meals or services from businesses to police officers is a widespread, traditional practice in many jurisdictions. Free coffee is perhaps the most commonly received gratuity. Extra services that businessmen expect in return for giving a gratuity may include such immediate acts as additional protection during business hours and after closing, police escorts to banks, and frequent patrol of the business vicinity.

July 2002 / 21

     When law enforcement officers offer additional law enforcement services to private businesses in exchange for a free advised that cup of coffee, they detract from other citizens within the owners their communities. Police service cannot be perceived quently, the as going to the highest bidder; decisions must be charge based on need.

     In one city, officers arrested a local shop owner business for drunk driving. The shop owner had supplied free alarms, but coffee and discounted meals to department personnel long list of for years. The shop owner took the arrest as a breach The media of an unwritten contract where he would receive on the special privileges in return for supplying free coffee Many and discounted meals. Apparently, the local police that owners department had never done anything to give the shop cup and owner this opinion. The shop owner became irate and demanded that the department drop the charges, which it could not do. Instead, the officers took up a collection and paid his fines. But, the shop owner still was not satisfied. He went to the local newspaper with the names of officers who had received 1,300 free cups of coffee (apparently, the officers had to sign for the cups). In addition, a list of 300 discounted meals, along with the officers names, appeared on the front page of the local newspaper. Some citizens argued that the ment did not officers accepted the coffee with no intention of cup of coffee giving favorable treatment to the shop owner or distinguished anyone else, while others claimed that no one else because when would have had their fines paid by the police. “To construed determine if corruption exists, use the totality of perception circumstances. Was there quid pro quo, or were officer was special privileges given in return for the free item?”⁵

Most officers agree that offering free goods and officer if the services as an entitlement and basing efforts in he advised handling a complaint on what the complainant has example, the given the officer is unethical. But, according to the giving of the majority of officers I spoke to, a huge gray area gift a gratuity exists, especially in the acceptance of free coffee to corruption increase officer presence. Perception is important; explained accepting a free cup of coffee may be harmless. remains that However, the public’s perception is important in the violator based support and view that the community has for their law enforcement agency. One officer I interviewed a new restaurant opened in her town and gave free meals to police officers. Subse- city implemented a policy that began to businesses after the police department re-a limited number of false alarms. The new received a bill because of its number of false the owners refused to pay based on the free meals given to the police department. The media published the story, which reflected poorly department.

Many argue that the coffee is inexpensive and are showing appreciation by offering a enjoying the fact that officers spend time in their shops. Therefore, what is the harm? On the other hand, what happens in discretionary issues where officers stop the owner or an employee for speeding? They may base their decision whether to cite on the fact that they received free coffee. Should the free coffee factor in the officers’ decisions?

     I spoke with an officer who wrote the policy on gratuities for his department. He advised that officers may accept gratuities but not solicit them. He explained that the depart- want to deny its officers from taking a or meal as a goodwill gesture. He between the solicitation and acceptance an officer asks for a gratuity, it can be as expected. If the gratuity is not given, the of retaliation may become an issue if the put into the position of enforcement store owner or employee. I asked the public’s perception was a problem, and that it has not become an issue. In this thought behind the acceptance and gratuity is important. “What makes a is the reason it is given, what makes it is the reason it is taken.”⁶ The officer also that on a discretionary call the possibility the officer may decide in favor of the on the giving of gratuities, but this has in his department.

22 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

Recommendations

     Clearly, no overall consensus exists on the acceptance of gratuities or even what constitutes a gratuity. As an administrator, the commonsense approach would be to not allow officers to accept free coffee and discounted or free meals. Accepting gratuities can lead t