confession. Because the lower court already had found Dickersons confession to be voluntary, the Fourth Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to finally decide the issue.
The Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion on Dickerson
on June 26, 2000. In a 7-2 decision, the court held that Miranda is a
Constitutional decision and, therefore, could not be overruled by an Act of
Congress.23 The Court not only affirmed Miranda but also declared
it a Constitutional rule.24 Aside from elaborating in great detail
as to why its finding that Miranda is Constitutionally required was consistent
with its original decision and its progeny, the Court gave two other noteworthy
justifications. The Court found that Miranda has become embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part
of our national culture.25 The Court also said ...experience
suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances test which § 3501 seeks
to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers
to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.26
Thus, 32 years after enactment, § 3501 has been ruled unconstitutional,
and the precustodial interrogation requirements of Miranda have been
given a permanent place in our jurisprudence.27
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: CIVIL LIABILITY
The Supreme Courts decision in Dickerson
was both a surprise and a disappointment to many.28
The decision clearly elevates the warning requirements of Miranda to
Constitutional proportions; the single most significant practical impact of
which is potential civil liability of individual law enforcement officers and
their departments resulting from intentional violations of the warning requirements
mandated in Miranda.
...the Court held that Miranda is a Constitutional decision and, therefore, could not be overruled by an Act of Congress. "
Title 42 U.S.C.
§ 198329 (hereafter §1983) provides a federal remedy for
deprivations of federal Constitutional rights by authorizing suits against public
officials and government entities.30 To recover under § 1983,
a civil rights plaintiff must prove two elements: 1) intentional deprivation
of a federally protected right secured by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States, and 2) state action under color of law.31
Section 1983 was applied to federal law enforcement agencies in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.32 A host of individual
state causes of action mirror §1983 suits that can result in liability
to the department and personal liability to the individual officer.
Section 1983 requires intentional conduct or gross
negligence by the government employee. Mere negligence is not actionable under
§1983.33 For example, if an interrogator were to negligently
give defective warnings, this would not result in §1983 liability.
In addition to the individual officer being exposed
to §1983 liability, the agency or department also can be sued for Constitutional
violations arising from official policy or other customs or practices of the
entity.34 Inadequate training also may be the basis for liability
if the failure to train amounts to a deliberate indifference to rights of persons
with whom police come in contact.35
Prior to the Supreme Courts decision in
Dickerson, the clear majority view among the federal circuits was that
no cause of action for money damages existed under §1983 where police officers
allegedly violated Miranda principles by either failing to give Miranda
warnings or by continuing to question a defendant in custody after his request
for an attorney.36 The rationale prior to Dickerson was that
the U.S. Constitution did not guarantee the right to Miranda warnings.
Dickerson only can be read to have changed this and to have created the
requisite Constitutional right that satisfies the previously void §1983
element. While the Court in Dickerson did not expressly address the issue
of civil liability and may at some future time limit §1983 liability exposure
in the Miranda context, the only prudent course for law enforcement officers
today is to proceed assuming that this §1983 cause of action is now viable.
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