the voluntariness of a subject’s incriminating statements. This left law enforcement agencies in a quandary over which rule to follow.
     Despite the passage of § 3501, law enforcement agencies generally followed the Miranda rule and ignored the statute. This is most likely due to the common approach of law enforcement agencies to take the more conservative option when such a conflict presents itself. The Department of Justice, through the seven administrations between Miranda and Dickerson, refused to argue § 3501 and also followed the Miranda decision in confession cases.

THE DICKERSON CASE

The Facts

^{"Departments must ensure that their} officers do not interrogate ‘outside Miranda,’ and immediately abandon any condoned practice or policy of intentional violations of Miranda."

     On January 24, 1997, an individual robbed the First Virginia Bank in Old Town, Alexandria, Virginia, of approximately $876. An eyewitness saw the robber exit the bank, run down the street, and get into a vehicle. Subsequent investigation into the bank robbery revealed that the getaway car was registered to Charles T. Dickerson of Takoma Park, Maryland. On January 27, 1997, FBI agents and an Alexandria police detective traveled to Dickerson’s residence. The agents knocked on Dickerson’s door and identified themselves. After a short conversation, an FBI agent asked Dickerson if he would accompany them to the FBI field office in Washington, D.C. Dickerson agreed. While in Dickerson’s apartment, the agents saw evidence of the bank robbery in plain view.
     At the FBI field office, Dickerson was interviewed by an FBI agent and a detective of the Alexandria Police Department. It is uncontested that at some point during the interview, Dickerson appropriately was given his Miranda warnings and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights in writing. It also is uncontested that Dickerson confessed to the Alex-andria bank robbery and numerous others and identified an accomplice. During the interview of Dickerson, the interviewing agents made application for, and received, a telephonic search warrant for Dickerson’s apartment. The search warrant was executed while the interview continued. The agents conducting the search found substantial evidence implicating Dickerson in several bank robberies. He was arrested and indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, on three counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and on three counts of using a firearm during, and in relation to, a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).²¹
      At the inevitable evidence suppression hearing, Dickerson testified that his confession was made before he received his Miranda warnings and, therefore, violated Miranda. The interviewing FBI agent testified that Dickerson confessed after receiving his Miranda warnings and voluntarily waiving them. There was no question that the confession was voluntary, but only whether it was made before or after Dickerson was warned and waived his Miranda rights. The district court judge suppressed his confession. The suppression of the confession was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
     The Fourth Circuit decided there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that Dickerson had not been given his Miranda rights prior to confessing.²² However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision to suppress the confession, finding the lower court used the wrong standard to judge the confession’s admissibility. The Fourth Circuit decided that by passing § 3501, Congress had lawfully changed the test for the admission of confessions in federal court from the stricter Miranda rule to the less stringent totality-of-the-circumstances test. Using that less stringent standard, the Fourth Circuit found that the government’s failure to give Miranda warnings was only one factor to be considered when judging voluntariness of the