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For Immediate Release
February
20, 2001
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Washington D.C.
FBI National Press Office
(202) 324-3691
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Statement
of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh
On the Arrest of FBI Special Agent Robert Philip Hanssen
Sunday night
the FBI arrested Robert Philip Hanssen who has been charged
with committing espionage. Hanssen is a Special Agent of
the FBI with a long career in counterintelligence.
The investigation
that led to these charges is the direct result of the longstanding
FBI/CIA efforts, ongoing since the Aldrich Ames case, to
identify additional foreign penetrations of the United States
Intelligence Community. The investigation of Hanssen was
conducted by the FBI in partnership with the CIA, the Department
of State, and, of course, the Justice Department.
The complaint
alleges that Hanssen conspired to and did commit espionage
for Russia and the former Soviet Union. The actions alleged
date back as far as 1985 and, with the possible exception
of several years in the 1990s, continued until his arrest
on Sunday. He was arrested while in the process of using
a "dead drop" to clandestinely provide numerous
classified documents to his Russian handler.
It is alleged
that Hanssen provided to the former Soviet Union and subsequently
to Russia substantial volumes of highly classified information
that he acquired during the course of his job responsibilities
in counterintelligence. In return, he received large sums
of money and other remuneration. The complaint alleges that
he received over $600,000.
The full extent
of the damage done is yet unknown because no accurate damage
assessment could be conducted without jeopardizing the investigation.
We believe it was exceptionally grave.
The criminal
conduct alleged represents the most traitorous actions imaginable
against a country governed by the Rule of Law. As difficult
as this moment is for the FBI and for the country, I am
immensely proud of the men and women who conducted this
investigation. Their actions represent counterintelligence
at its very best and under the most difficult and sensitive
of circumstances. Literally, Hanssen's colleagues and coworkers
at the FBI conducted this investigation and did so quietly,
securely and without hesitation. Much of what these men
and women did remains undisclosed but their success and
that of their CIA counterparts represents unparalleled expertise
and dedication to both principle and mission.
The complaint
alleges that Hanssen, using the code name "Ramon,"
engaged in espionage by providing highly classified information
to the KGB and its successor agency, the SVR, using encrypted
communications, dead drops, and other clandestine techniques.
The information he is alleged to have provided compromised
numerous human sources, technical operations, counterintelligence
techniques, sources and methods, and investigations, including
the Felix Bloch investigation.
The affidavit
alleges that Hanssen voluntarily became an agent of the
KGB in 1985 while assigned to the intelligence division
at the FBI field office in New York City as supervisor of
a foreign counterintelligence squad. Hanssen allegedly began
spying for the Soviets in 1985 when, in his first letter
to the KGB, he volunteered information that compromised
several sensitive techniques. He also independently disclosed
the identity of two KGB officials who, first compromised
by Aldrich Ames, had been recruited by the U.S. Government
to serve as "agents in place" at the Soviet Embassy
in Washington. When these two KGB officials returned to
Moscow, they were tried and convicted on espionage charges
and executed.
Hanssen subsequently
was assigned to a variety of national security posts that
legitimately provided him access to classified information
relating to the former Soviet Union and Russia. As a result
of these assignments within the FBI, Hanssen gained access
to some of the most sensitive and highly classified information
in the United States Government. To be very clear on this
issue, at no time was he authorized to communicate information
to agents of the KGB/SVR. Nor can there be any doubt that
he was keenly aware of the gravity of his traitorous actions.
He later wrote to his KGB handler, speaking about the severity
with which U.S. laws punishes his alleged actions, and acknowledging
"...I know far better than most what minefields are
laid and the risks."
Hanssen was detailed
to the Office of Foreign Missions at the Department of State
from 1995 to 2000. The complaint, however, does not allege
any compromises by him at the State Department. In one letter
to his Russian handlers, Hanssen complains about lost opportunities
to alert them that the FBI had discovered the microphone
hidden at the State Department, known then by the FBI but
apparently not by Hanssen as being monitored by a Russian
intelligence officer. In this assignment, however, Hanssen
did continue to have access to sensitive FBI information
as he remained assigned to the FBI's National Security Division
and routinely dealt with sensitive and classified matters.
For many years,
the CIA and FBI have been aggressively engaged in a sustained
analytical effort to identify foreign penetrations of the
Intelligence Community. That effort is complemented by substantial
FBI proactive investigation of foreign service intelligence
officers here and by the critical work done by the CIA.
Because of these coordinated efforts, the FBI was able to
secure original Russian documentation of an American spy
who appeared to the FBI to be Hanssen -- a premise that
was soon to be confirmed when Hanssen was identified by
the FBI as having clandestinely communicated with Russian
intelligence officers.
As alleged in
the complaint, computer forensic analysis, substantial covert
surveillance, court authorized searches and other sensitive
techniques revealed that Hanssen has routinely accessed
FBI records and clandestinely provided those records and
other classified information to Russian intelligence officers.
As alleged, he did so using a variety of sophisticated means
of communication, encryption, and dead drops.
Further, the
complaint alleges that Hanssen, using his training and experience
to protect himself from discovery by the FBI, never met
face-to-face with his Russian handlers, never revealed to
them his true identity or where he worked, constantly checked
FBI records for signs he and the drop sites he was using
were being investigated, refused any foreign travel to meet
with the Russians, and even declined to accept any "trade
craft." Hanssen never displayed outward signs that
he was receiving large amounts of unexplained cash. He was,
after all, a trained counterintelligence specialist. For
these reasons, the FBI learned of his true identity before
the Russians; they are learning of it only now. Even without
knowing who he was or where he worked, Hanssen's value to
the Russians was clear both by the substantial sums of money
paid and the prestigious awards given to their own agents
for Hanssen's operation.
While this arrest
represents a counterintelligence investigative success,
the complaint alleges that Hanssen located and removed undetected
from the FBI substantial quantities of information that
he was able to access as a result of his assignments. None
of the internal information or personnel security measures
in place alerted those charged with internal security to
his activities. In short, the trusted insider betrayed his
trust without detection.
While the risk
that an employee of the United States Government will betray
his country can never be eliminated, there must be more
that the FBI can do to protect itself from such an occurrence.
I have asked Judge William H. Webster, and he has graciously
agreed, to examine thoroughly the internal security functions
and procedures of the FBI and recommend improvements. Judge
Webster is uniquely qualified as a former FBI Director,
CIA Director and Director of Central Intelligence to undertake
this review. This is particularly timely as we move to the
next generation of automation to support the FBI's information
infrastructure. Judge Webster and anyone he selects to assist
him will have complete access and whatever resources are
necessary to complete this task. He will report directly
to the Attorney General and me and we will share his report
with the National Security Council and Congress. I intend
to act swiftly on his recommendations.
Before concluding,
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Director
of Central Intelligence George Tenet for the cooperation
and assistance of his agency in this investigation. Through
our cooperative efforts, the FBI and CIA were able to learn
the true identity of "Ramon" and the FBI was able
to conduct a solid investigation. Our joint efforts over
the last several years and specifically in this case should
give pause to those contemplating betrayal of the Nation's
trust. Without the current unprecedented level of trust
and cooperation between the CIA and FBI, making this case
would not have been possible. Nor would many other intelligence
and counterintelligence accomplishments that routinely but
quietly contribute to the security of this Nation.
Through Attorney
General John Ashcroft, I would like to thank the Department
of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern
District of Virginia. The level of support and expertise
from Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert Mueller, Counsel
for Intelligence Policy Frances Fragos Townsend, U.S. Attorney
Helen Fahey and Assistant United States Attorney Randy Bellows
is superb. We particularly appreciate the unhesitating leadership
and support of Attorney General Ashcroft from the moment
he took office.
Director Tenet
and I have briefed the intelligence committees of Congress
because of the clear national security implications.
As Director of
the FBI, I am proud of the courageous men and women of the
FBI who each day make enormous sacrifices in serving their
country. They have committed their lives to public service
and to upholding the high standards of the FBI. Since becoming
Director over seven years ago, I have administered the FBI
oath to each graduating class of Special Agents at the FBI
Academy. Each time, I share the pride and sanctity of those
words when new agents swear to "support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic" and to "bear true faith
and allegiance to the same."
Regrettably,
I stand here today both saddened and outraged. An FBI Agent
who raised his right hand and spoke those words over 25
years ago has been charged today with violating that oath
in the most egregious and reprehensible manner imaginable.
The FBI entrusted him with some of the most sensitive secrets
of the United States Government and instead of being humbled
by this honor, Hanssen has allegedly abused and betrayed
that trust. The crimes alleged are an affront not only to
his fellow FBI employees but to the American people, not
to mention the pain and suffering he has brought upon his
family. Our hearts go out to them. I take solace and satisfaction,
however, that the FBI succeeded in this investigation. As
an agency, we lived up to our responsibility, regardless
of how painful it might be.
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