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October 1999 Volume 1 Number
3
Part 2 of Presentations
at the
2nd International Symposium on the
Forensic Examination of Questioned Documents
Albany, New York,
June 14 – 18, 1999
Appendix B: States That Rejected
Frye Pre-Daubert
Post-Daubert
Considerations in Document Examinations
P. C. Giannelli, A. J.
Weatherhead, and R. W. Weatherhead
Case Western Reserve
University
Cleveland, Ohio
Arkansas. Moore v. State, 323 Ark.
529, 547, 915 S.W.2d 284, 294 (1996) (DNA evidence no longer
novel; "Daubert ... adopted a reliability approach
to Rule 702, comparable to the relevancy approach of Prater in
which reliability is the critical element").
Delaware. Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d
69, 73 (Del. 1993) ("Our decisions [in prior cases] are
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert")
(DNA admissible only with statistical probability).
Georgia. Carr v. State, 482 S.E.2d
314, 317 (Ga. 1997) (dog alert to fire accelerants not shown
"with verifiable certainty" to be accurate and reliable).
Iowa. Hutchison v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1994) (Daubert
consistent with Iowa precedents).
Louisiana. State v. Quatrevingt, 670
So. 2d 197 (La. 1996) (ruling band-shifting in DNA analysis not
reliable), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996); State
v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) ("Past decisions
of this court have espoused similar sentiments [as Daubert]
...") (child abuse accommodation syndrome excluded).
Maine. State v. Taylor, 694 A.2d
907, 910 (Me. 1997) (horizontal gaze nystagmus) (citing State
v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978)).
Military. United States v. Buenaventura,
40 M.J. 519, 525 (A.C.M.R. 1994) (child sexual abuse syndrome)
(Military's approach "closely parallels" Daubert),
rev'd on other grounds, 45 M.J. 72 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
Montana. State v. Cline, 909 P.2d
1171, 1177, 1178 (Mont. 1996) ("[T]his Court has adopted
the standard set forth in Daubert. ... Daubert
test should only be used to determine the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence"; "[T]he State established the
necessary foundation regarding the issue of determining the age
of fingerprints"); State v. Moore, 268 Mont. 20,
42, 885 P.2d 457, 471 (Mont. 1994) (DNA-PCR admitted) ("[T]he
guidelines set forth in Daubert are consistent with our
previous holding in Barmeyer concerning the admission
of expert testimony of novel scientific evidence, and we, therefore,
adopt the Daubert standard ...").
North Carolina. State v. Goode, 341 N.C.
513, 461 S.E.2d 631 (1995) (bloodstain pattern interpretation
admissible under N.C. approach, which is consistent with Daubert).
Oregon. State v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285,
306, 899 P.2d 663, 680 (1995) (en banc) ("Both Daubert
and Brown allow Frye's ‘general acceptance'
standard to be considered as one factor in the trial court's
decision about admissibility. ... Faced with a proffer of expert
scientific testimony, an Oregon trial court ... should, therefore,
find Daubert instructive"; HGN intoxication test
is scientifically valid). See also State v. Lyons, 324
Or. 256, 260 n. 1, 924 P.2d 802, 804 n. 1 (1996) (DNA-PCR).
South Carolina. State v. Council, 1999 S.C.
Lexis 76, * 26, *28 (Apr. 5, 1999) (mitochondrial DNA) ("[T]his
Court has never adopted [the Frye] standard.") ("While
this Court does not adopt Daubert, we find the proper
analysis for determining admissibility of scientific evidence
is now under the SCRE [Rules 702 and 403]. ... The trial court
should apply the Jones factors to determine reliability.")
(citing State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979)
((1) publications and peer review of the technique, (2) prior
application of the method to the type of evidence involved in
the case, (3) the quality control procedures used to ensure reliability,
and (4) the consistency of the method with recognized scientific
laws and procedures).
Texas. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and
Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. 1995) (Noting
that there are "professional experts" who sometimes
put forth "junk science," comments that Daubert
properly strengthens the role of trial judge as gatekeeper in
civil cases.); Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.
Crim. 1997) (Texas follows State v. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d
568 (Tex. Crim. 1992), and Daubert)).
Utah. State v. Cosby, 927 P.2d
638, 642 (Utah 1996) ("If there is a noteworthy difference
between the two opinions, it is perhaps that our opinion in Rimmasch
provides a detailed and rigorous outline for trial courts to
follow when making determinations concerning the admissibility
of scientific evidence. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403 ("[T]he
trial court should carefully explore each logical link in the
chain that leads to expert testimony given in court and determine
its reliability.") The Supreme Court in Daubert,
on the other hand, emphasized a more flexible approach. ...").
Vermont. State v. Brooks, 162 Vt.
26, 643 A.2d 226 (Vt. 1993) (Daubert consistent with Vermont
precedents).
Wyoming. Springfield v. State, 860
P.2d 435, 442-43 (Wyo. 1993) (DNA).
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FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNICATIONS OCTOBER 1999 VOLUME
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