Statement
of
Donald Van Duyn
Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and
Related Agencies
September 19, 2006
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member and members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you on the issue of prison radicalization
in the United States.
Before I begin, I would like to emphasize that
Islam itself is not the problem but rather how Islam
is used by violent extremists to inspire and justify
their actions. Additionally, the FBI does not investigate
individuals for their religious beliefs. Rather,
we investigate the activities of individuals who
want to do harm to the citizens and interests of
United States and those of our allies abroad. The
FBI fully recognizes and is committed to protecting
prisoners' civil liberties, including religious rights.
These activities have led us to believe that prisons
continue to present opportunities for the proselytizing
of both Sunni and Shia forms of radical Islam. Moreover,
domestic groups such as white supremacists recruit
in prisons as well.
The U.S. Prison Environment
FBI and the Bureau of Prisons analysis shows that
radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prisons is
still an ongoing concern. Prison radicalization primarily
occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract,
volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who
gain religious influence, and extremist media. Ideologies
that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace
include or are influenced by the Salafi form of Sunni
Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known
as “prison Islam”) and an extremist view
of Shia Islam similar to that of the government of
Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
There are two groups of concern involved in prison
radicalization and recruitment.
The first group consists of inmates, the majority
of whom are minority group members. Although most
are converts to Islam, there is a smaller number
who were born into the Muslim faith. These radicalized
inmates either feel discriminated against in the
United States or feel that the United States oppresses
minorities and Muslims overseas. The feeling of perceived
oppression, combined with their limited knowledge
of Islam, especially for the converts, makes this
a vulnerable population for extremists looking to
radicalize and recruit.
Radicalized inmates are of concern for a number
of reasons:
The second group consists of contract, volunteer,
and staff personnel, the majority of which are imams,
who enter correctional facilities with the intent
to radicalize and recruit.
Particularly for Muslim converts, but also for
those born into Islam, an extremist imam can strongly
influence individual belief systems by speaking from
a position of authority on religious issues. Extremist
imams have the potential to influence vulnerable
followers at various locations of opportunity; can
spot and assess individuals who respond to their
messages; and can potentially guide them into increasingly
extremist circles.
Aside from individuals providing radical messages
there is also extremist media in the form of literature
and videos being circulated within the prison population
that appears to be a significant factor in prison
radicalization.
In
some cases, these radicalization efforts expand
beyond prison walls resulting in potential threats
to society at large.
The Threat
The majority of cases involving prison radicalization
and recruitment have not manifested themselves as
a threat to national security. There have been, however,
instances where charismatic elements within prison
have used the call of Global Jihad as a source of
inspiration to recruit others for the purpose of
conducting terrorist attacks in the United States.
In July 2005, the FBI became aware of a Sunni Islamic
extremist group in California operating primarily
in state prisons, without apparent connections or
direction from outside the United States and with
no identifiable foreign power nexus. Members of this
group, the Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS),
or the “Authentic Assembly of Islam,” were
involved in almost a dozen armed gas station robberies
in Los Angeles with the goal of financing terrorist
operations in furtherance of JIS goals.
JIS founder Kevin Lamar James, an inmate in the
California prison system, was the principal recruiter
for the group. Recruitment of participants to the
Los Angeles JIS cell began in prison with the recruitment
of Levar Washington by James in December 2004. James
allegedly instructed Washington to recruit five people
to train in covert operations, acquire firearms with
silencers, and find contacts with explosives expertise
or who could learn to make bombs that could be activated
from a distance. Upon release from prison, Washington
recruited other co-conspirators, Gregory Patterson
and Hamad Samana, to begin fulfilling James’ wishes.
On August 31, 2005, James, Washington, Patterson,
and Samana were indicted by a federal grand jury
for conspiracy to levy war against the U.S. government
through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge
firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. Washington,
Patterson, and Samana were also charged with conspiracy
to kill members of the U.S. government uniformed
services and conspiracy to kill foreign officials.
Washington and Patterson were further charged with
interfering with commerce by robbery and for using
and carrying a firearm in connection with a crime
of violence. All members are currently in custody
awaiting trial.
The JIS case provides valuable insight into an
increasing phenomenon in many of our terrorism cases
here in the United States, as well as those around
the world, and highlights the importance of cooperation
at all levels of the law enforcement community in
order to effectively fight terrorism.
The Response
The FBI and the Bureau of Prisons have been actively
engaged in efforts to detect, deter, and disrupt
efforts by extremist groups to radicalize and recruit
in U.S prisons; since February 2003, these activities
have been organized through the Correctional Intelligence
Initiative (CII).
The CII program focuses on:
- Improving intelligence collection.
- Detecting, deterring, and disrupting efforts
by terrorist, extremist, or radical groups to radicalize
or recruit in federal, state, local, territorial,
tribal, or privatized prisons.
- Providing training and support materials that
can be used by field offices and Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs) for training and outreach at
state and local correctional institutions.
All
of these elements have helped identify numerous
factors responsible for the spread of radicalization
and recruitment in prisons. A recent comprehensive
assessment based on a survey of nearly 3,000 state
and local correctional facilities identified the
following trends:
- Most cases of prison radicalization and recruitment
appear to be originated by domestic extremists
with few or no foreign connections.
- Some radicalized Islamic inmates are current
or former members of street or prison gangs, indicating
an emerging “crossover” trend from
gang member to Islamist extremist.
- Radicalization activity levels appear to be
higher in high population areas on the West Coast
and in the northeastern United States.
Aside
from trends, the assessment identified “best
practices” for correctional institutions to
follow to combat the spread of radicalization and
recruitment. Some of these are:
- Establish system-wide vetting protocols for
all contractor and volunteer applicants;
- The FBI provides assistance by conducting
criminal history checks against all FBI indices
for contract, volunteer, and staff personnel
entering correctional facilities. Relevant information
is passed on to correctional officials for appropriate
action.
- Create system-wide databases of contractors
and volunteers providing direct inmate services;
- Improve monitoring capabilities;
- Coordinate inmate transfers;
- Share information among all levels of law enforcement
and correctional personnel. FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Forces can facilitate this process.
Numerous FBI analytical products, as well as operational
highlights, have been disseminated to foreign liaison
partners, from classified products to unclassified
assessments meant for a wide audience. The feedback
from the latter has helped us better drive analytical
perspectives and identify services where bi-lateral
exchanges could prove beneficial on this issue.
At this time, I would like to thank the committee
for the opportunity to address this important issue.
