Statement
of
John E. Lewis
Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forestry
July 20, 2005
Good
morning, Chairman Chambliss, Ranking Member
Harkin, and members of the Committee. It is
a pleasure to be here today.
Since
September 11th, we have necessarily sharpened
our focus on unconventional methods of future
attacks, including the potential for agroterrorism.
Most people do not equate terrorist attacks
with Agroterrorism. But the threat is real,
and the impact could be devastating.
Today
I want to talk about what the FBI is doing to
prevent, detect, and investigate threats of
agroterrorism. We have been fortunate so far
- we have not faced any direct large scale attacks
to our food supply. We have investigated possible
Agroterrorism attacks with our interagency partners,
ultimately determining that these were cases
of product tampering, natural disease outbreaks,
or accidental events.
The
absence of any direct attack on our food supply
does not minimize the threat. We know that members
of Al Qaeda have studied our agricultural industry
along with other potential targets. In addition,
some animal rights activists and environmental
extremists have touted agroterrorism as a potential
means to end animal testing, animal consumption,
and genetic engineering.
One
thing is certain: given the nature of the threat,
the partnerships the FBI has developed, and
that we are diligently working to expand and
strengthen will go a long way toward preventing
potential agroterrorism attacks.
Today,
we are sharing information, technology, and
resources with our federal, state, and local
counterparts as well as industry.
One
of the ways we are working together is through
the Agricultural Intelligence Working Group.
Members of this group - including the FBI, the
CIA, the USDA, the FDA, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the military - meet regularly
to exchange information and ideas about food
security, and to discuss ways in which we can
best utilize our combined skills, technology,
and resources to prevent an attack on our food
and agriculture sector.
Another
way we are working together is through various
Scientific Working Groups. FBI scientists are
working with their counterparts around the country.
Scientists from the CDC, key laboratories around
the country, the CIA, and the Department of
Homeland Security, analyzes animal and plant
pathogens - down to the DNA level - to distinguish
between pathogens that occur in nature, and
those that are intentionally spread. This distinction
is important. Recovery of the components of
an improvised explosive device at the scene
of an explosion can clearly indicate an intentional
act has occurred. In contrast, if a cow contracts
Foot and Mouth Disease or a soybean plant exhibits
rust, it can be difficult, if not impossible,
to determine whether the attack was intentional
or occurred naturally.
We
are not limiting our partnerships to the federal
level. We are reaching out to the people on
the front lines - farmers, cattle ranchers,
food producers, and distributors.
FBI
Headquarters is directing the formation of a
program called Ag-Guard, as well as the formation
of Agroterrorism Working Groups nationwide.
The Ag-Guard program is modeled after our existing
Infraguard network. Through a secure web portal,
members of the agricultural community are sharing
information with each other, and with scientists,
state and local law enforcement, and the FBI.
Members can pose questions, and alert the FBI
to any suspicious or unusual activity. This
program is a win-win for everyone involved.
We are continuing to expand this program and
expect to have a nationwide network developed
in the near future.
Additionally, the FBI has formed a partnership
with the DHS, USDA, FDA, and private industry
to conduct site surveys of specific private
industries within the agriculture industry.
The intent of this Strategic Partnership Program
is to determine critical points in our agricultural
system that may be the target of a terrorist
attack, identify early indicators and warnings
that would signify planning and/or preparation
for an attack, develop a focus for intelligence
collection strategies around these indicators
and warnings, and develop mitigation strategies
for early detection, deterrence, disruption,
interdiction, and prevention.
We
are currently working with the Food and Agriculture
Sector Coordinating Council and the Government
Coordinating Council (GCC) to identify approximately
50 sites that we hope to visit over the next
two years. The sites will include the entire
production cycle, from farm to fork.
Now,
I want to move to the FBI's detection and investigative
methods. I will discuss the two together, because
both rely upon the partnerships that we have
established with our interagency partners.
We
currently lead 105 Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
These JTTFs are the focal point of our counterterrorism
efforts. The JTTFs are aided in these efforts
by highly trained WMD Coordinators in each field
office. WMD threat related information is provided
to the WMD Coordinator either via the extensive
liaison network that each has established locally,
or through the JTTF. The WMD Coordinator then
contacts FBI Headquarters where we facilitate
the interagency threat assessment process.
This
threat assessment process capitalizes upon the
expertise of scientists and subject matter experts
both within the FBI and those of our interagency
partners. Our Hazardous Materials Response Unit
and the 27 Hazardous Materials Response Teams
they oversee in our field offices possess significant
capabilities to collect and assess potential
WMD materials, further enhancing our capability
to provide timely input into the interagency
threat assessment process. The same process
is utilized in the event the threat involves
a potential chemical release or agroterrorism.
It is a process we utilize almost every day
across the nation. We continue to expand our
agroterrorism specific liaison contacts.
In order to expand this information sharing,
in July of 2004, I directed field offices nationwide
to identify and survey agriculture and food
systems within their jurisdiction. I tasked
field offices to assess the level of interaction
and coordination between the FBI and key infrastructure
officials in this sector on preparedness and
information sharing matters.
To
further formalize the mechanism for communication
of threat information and to strengthen the
FBI's relationship with the food and agriculture
sector, field offices were directed to establish
formal Agroterrorism Working Groups within their
jurisdiction. This working group will enhance
the already established relationships between
Federal partners by bringing together representatives
from all entities involved in the areas of proactive
prevention and awareness, intelligence, investigative
response, and crisis management.
The
Select Agent Registration Program was established
to enhance the security of specific biological
pathogens and toxins. Under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002 , the Attorney General has the responsibility
to query criminal, immigration, national security,
and other electronic databases to determine
if an individual applying for select agent status
is a restricted person.
Animal
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and
CDC Select Agent Program personnel have the
responsibility of determining if a facility
and/or an individual is properly trained and
has the appropriate skills to handle the listed
select agents and toxins; has proper laboratory
facilities to contain and dispose of listed
agents and toxins; including provisions to ensure
that facilities and individuals seeking to register
have a legitimate purpose to receive, possess,
or transfer such agents and toxins. The FBI
Criminal Justice Information Services Division
(CJIS) has been designated to conduct the Security
Risk Assessments (background checks) mandated
under the Bioterrorism Act. CJIS processes the
background checks on the facility owner/operator,
the Responsible Official, and all facility employees
requesting access to listed biological agents
and toxins.
In
the event that the background check raises additional
concerns about an applicant a lead will be set
to gather additional information to clarify
and determine if sufficient information is available
to restrict the individuals' access to listed
select agents or toxins. FBIHQ will then coordinate
with USDA and CDC to determine whether an applicant
is restricted or not.
These
are just a few examples of what the FBI is doing
to prevent, detect, and investigate agroterrorism.
But information sharing is a two-way street.
We cannot investigate if we are not aware of
the problem.
Farmers,
ranchers, food distributors, and producers are
the first line of defense. If a rancher sees
unusual symptoms of illness in the herd, he
must notify his veterinarian or a representative
from the USDA. If a food distributor notes suspicious
activity in one of her distribution centers,
she must notify the FDA or USDA FSIS, local
law enforcement, or her FBI Field Office. Likewise,
we in the federal government and in the public
health sector must keep each other in the loop.
This is why the establishment of Agroterrorism
Working Groups is important.
Our
goal is to impress upon those in the food supply
industry, and those of us who work with them,
of the need for education, vigilance, and cooperation.
We
are working with our partners in the federal
government, in state and local law enforcement,
in scientific labs, on college campuses across
the country, and with members of the agricultural
industry. We are sharing our information, our
resources, and our knowledge to ensure the safety
of our nation's food supply.
