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Testimony of Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director,
Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, FBI
Before the Select
Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House
of Representative
September 26, 2002
"Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry"
Introduction
Good morning Messrs. Chairmen
and members of the Committees. I am Dale Watson, the FBI's
Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
and I am pleased to appear before you today with my colleague
Cofer Black from the CIA. I plan to describe to you the FBI's
counterterrorism role within the Intelligence Community prior
to September 11, 2001, and to provide my observations of the
changes made since then to better enable the Intelligence
Community to detect and prevent future attacks. Late last
week and earlier this week, the Committees heard, in great
detail, about the FBI's actions relating to two of the September
11 hijackers - Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi; about
Zacarias Moussaoui, and a July 2001 communication from our
Phoenix FBI Office. While I will be glad to provide my perspective
on those matters, in response to your questions, the majority
of my testimony will highlight the FBI's interagency coordination
and collaboration of counterterrorism activities within the
Intelligence Community, the evolution of the FBI's response
to the growing international threat, and the FBI's future
role in the war on terrorism.
History of the FBI Counterterrorism
Program
Before I can address where the
FBI is today, I need to give you a short history of the FBI's
Counterterrorism Program beginning in 1993.
In February 1993, an explosion
occurred in the garage area beneath the Vista Hotel, located
at the World Trade Center complex in New York City, New York,
resulting in massive destruction, the death of six individuals
and injuring a thousand others. Within the FBI and across
the United States, this was a wake-up call that there were
individuals in the United States who sought to do us great
harm.
It was the April 1995, bombing
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, resulting in the death of 168 persons,
that provided further confirmation that a terrorist strike
could be committed on U.S. soil. Prior to this time, terrorism
was perceived as an overseas problem, as indicated in the
1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 where all 259 passengers, mostly
Americans, died.
The overseas trend continued
in November1995, with the bombing of the Office of Personnel
Management, Saudi Arabian National Guard, resulting in the
deaths of five servicemen. In 1996, the bombing of Khobar
Towers resulted in the deaths of 19 servicemen.
In 1998, the Embassy bombings
in Kenya and Tanzania resulted in the deaths of 12 Americans
in Nairobi, Kenya. In November 2000, the U.S.S. Cole bombing
resulted in the death of 17 Navy seamen. Then September 11,
2001, the mostly deadly terrorist attacks against the United
States - which resulted in over 3,000 deaths.
In the early years, the FBI's
Counterterrorism Program was a relatively low-priority Program
as demonstrated by its size, with approximately 50 people
at FBI Headquarters, working on all aspects of terrorism.
In May 1998, the FBI made Counterterrorism a Tier One priority
and began focusing additional attention and resources. Throughout
this period and as a result of our investigations of these
above mentioned incidents, professionals in the FBI's Counterterrorism
Program became aware of the threat posed by UBL and others
like him. Subsequently, in 1999, the FBI created a separate
operational unit focusing completely on UBL matters.
In1998, when I became Deputy
Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division after
the East Africa bombings, I realized the FBI was reacting
to these terrorist acts with no forward thinking to prevent
them. In late 1998, it became clear that no matter how many
resources the FBI put into the program, we were never going
to stop every act of terrorism. The solution would be to position
ourselves in the best proactive stance to counter this threat.
Beginning in late 1999, I began
working on a initiative designed to get the FBI at its maximum
capacity to address the Counterterrorism threat by the year
2005 (MAXCAP05). I convened a working group of Special Agents
in Charge (SAC) to create a system to evaluate Counterterrorism
capacity in the field offices and build that capacity to encompass
prevention, as well as reaction. The main focus of this initiative
was not cases, which are by definition reactive, but rather
about knowing the environment. One of the by-products of this
process was a report designed to aid decision-makers, fostering
accountability, consistency and accuracy among FBI Executive
Management regarding understanding and countering the terrorist
threat. This initiative was a work-in-progress and I recognized
it would take several years to achieve maximum capacity. It
is important to note that we were in the midst of that process
on September 11, 2001, however, as a result of the work we
had done, we had developed a management tool that attempted
to quantify weaknesses based on a standard which was intentionally
set fairly high. (i.e., maximum capacity)
FBI Relationship with the
CIA
Much has been made during these
hearings about the relationship between the FBI and the CIA,
and not without cause. There is a long history between these
two proud organizations and I am pleased to be seated with
Cofer Black during this hearing today to discuss the changes
which have occurred from my perspective.
In 1996, as a result of an exchange
program initiated by FBI Director Freeh and Director of Central
Intelligence Deutch, I was the first Bureau official to participate
in an exchange of senior personnel between the FBI and CIA
in the Counter Terrorism arena. I was assigned as the Deputy
Chief with line authority to the Counter Terrorism Center
(CTC), and a senior CIA officer was assigned as the Deputy
Section Chief in the Counterterrorism Section at FBIHQ. This
exchange provided a foundation to solidify our future coordinated
efforts and was extremely beneficial as it was top-down-driven.
Since that time and continuing
today, the interaction between and the exchange of personnel,
both agent and analytical, has increased significantly, particularly
since September 11, 2001. This continues to contribute in
a decisive way to the Intelligence Community's mission directed
at the obtaining, analyzing and sharing of intelligence information,
thereby enhancing the United States Government's efforts to
identify, target and prevent terrorist activities.
During this period, the FBI
initiated a training program in which new CIA Chiefs of Station
are introduced to the FBI perspectives and capabilities on
terrorism matters, and new FBI Legats are provided the same
training regarding the CIA. Overseas, communication and coordination
are the hallmark of our relationship with other U.S. agencies.
While there might be individual
examples where information was not shared, institutionally
the barriers have come down and we are currently exchanging
information daily, if not hourly, with our colleagues at the
CIA.
Other Initiatives Supporting
Counterterrorism Efforts
During the 1990s, the changing
perspectives at FBI Headquarters regarding the growing threat
of international terrorism prompted then Director Freeh to
expand the FBI's Legat Program. When Mr. Freeh became FBI
Director in 1992, there were 16 Legats; when he left, there
were 44. This expansion has put more people on the ground
in more places, contributing to better investigations of terrorist
acts abroad, and better coverage of leads generated in domestic
investigations. Legats working with colleagues in the Departments
of Justice, Defense and State have also facilitated extraditions
of terrorists wanted for killing Americans, which must be
the absolute cornerstone of America's message to foreign terrorists:
anyone targeting American citizens and/or interests will face
justice---no matter where that attack takes place or where
that terrorist might hide.
The Legat Program's value became
even more apparent with their tireless efforts during the
investigation of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Their investigative efforts played a significant part in the
FBI's understanding of the September 11, 2001 conspiracy,
and will continue to pay dividends for years to come in identifying
key terrorists and preventing future attacks.
The FBI is taking a leadership
role in enhancing interagency cooperation and communication
through utilization of a proactive threat warning system.
The National Threat Warning System (NTWS) ensures vital information
regarding terrorism reaches those in the U.S. Intelligence
and Law Enforcement Communities responsible for countering
terrorist threats. The NTWS provides warnings to U.S. Government
components and law enforcement agencies in the United States
and Canada via the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System. The FBI also provides Warnings to private security
personnel via the "Awareness of National Security Issues
and Response" Program.
The FBI continues to assess
threats and issue warnings and advisories to the Intelligence
and Law Enforcement Communities, and are still leading the
multi-agency National Infrastructure Protection Center, a
key force in protecting our nation's critical physical and
electronic infrastructures.
There are currently over 56
established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in operation,
an increase of 45 since 1996. By integrating the investigative
abilities of the FBI and local law enforcement agencies these
JTTFs represent an effective response to the threats posed
to U.S. communities by domestic and international terrorists.
Within the FBI, the FBI's Counterterrorism
Center was established in 1996 and is designed to combat terrorism
on three fronts: International terrorism operations, within
the United States and in support of extraterritorial investigations;
Domestic terrorism operations; and Countermeasures, pertaining
to both international and domestic terrorism. Through the
FBI's Counterterrorism Center, the FBI has enhanced cooperation
with other US Government agencies. An exchange of working
level personnel and senior managers at the headquarters level
has also strengthened cooperation between the FBI and other
agencies.
Prior to September 11, 2001,
the FBI worked closely with all of the US Government through
efforts of the National Security Counsel. Regular, if not
daily meetings were held to discuss Counterterrorism matters.
The core group participating in these meetings were the CIA,
Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of
Justice and other Federal agencies as needed to discuss and
coordinate counterterrorism issues in the US Government.
Conclusion
The continuing threat and the
ever present reminder of the events since September 11, 2001,
have reconfirmed my belief that the FBI and our partners in
the Intelligence Community must continue to aggressively develop
the capacity to identify, penetrate and prevent terrorist
activities worldwide.
The FBI must be ready, in concert
with our Intelligence Community partners and foreign services
to respond to terrorism issues as they present themselves.
In order to do this, we must 1) develop a strategic analysis
program to recognize trends aimed at identifying and preventing
terrorists activities; 2) develop a coordination program within
the United States Intelligence Community and foreign services
to identify persons who have attended the terrorist training
camps in Afghanistan; 3) improve information sharing capabilities
with State and local law enforcement; 4) improve methods and
capabilities to track and remove terrorists from within our
borders; 5) increase and improve the technology to obtain
and analyze information; and 6) increase the number of analysts
assigned and trained in terrorism matters.
In closing, let me stress-terrorism
matters are the number one priority of the FBI. The FBI, along
with the CIA and other members of the Intelligence Community,
are working to coordinate multi-divisional and multi-agency
investigations to establish a robust intelligence base, with
adequate and on-going analysis to identify and stop any future
terrorist acts and strengthen our abilities to safeguard the
American people and our interests, both at home and abroad.
I thank you for the opportunity
to come before you today and am available to answer your questions.
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